




BEYOND RECOGNITION: LESSONS FROM CHILE FOR ALLOCATING 








Australian water law frameworks, which authorise water use, have historically 
excluded indigenous people. Indigenous land now exceeds 30 per cent of the total land 
in Australia.1 Yet indigenous water use rights are estimated at only 0.01 per cent of total 
Australian water allocations.2 In the limited situations where water law frameworks 
have engaged with indigenous interests, they typically conceive of such interests as 
falling outside of the ‘consumptive pool’3 of water applicable to commercial uses 
associated with activities on land such as irrigation, agriculture, industry or tourism.4  
 
The idea that states must ‘recognise’ indigenous groups, and their ongoing rights to land 
and resources, has become the central claim of the international indigenous rights 
movement.5 Claims for recognition of indigenous land and resource rights are the 
logical outcome of demands for indigenous rights based on ideas of ‘reparative’ 
justice.6 The colonisers failed to recognise indigenous rights to land and resources at 
the acquisition of sovereignty, the argument goes, and the remedy is to recognise those 
rights now. The dominant legal mechanism for recognising indigenous land and 
resource rights in Australia is native title: a common law doctrine first recognised in 
the now well-known Mabo v Queensland [No 2] (‘Mabo [No 2]’).7 Mabo [No 2] arose 
in response to the British Crown’s failure to recognise pre-existing indigenous land 
rights at the acquisition of sovereignty (in reliance on the legal fiction of terra nullius, 
meaning ‘land of no one’). The ‘recognition and protection’ of pre-existing native title 
 
  BCA, LLB (hons) (VUW), PhD (Melbourne), Lecturer, School of Law, University of 
Canterbury. This research was carried out while the author was undertaking a PhD at the 
University of Melbourne. All translations have been made by the author, with italics used for 
Spanish language terms. 
1  Jon Altman and Francis Markham, ‘Values Mapping Indigenous Lands: An Exploration of 
Development Possibilities’ (Paper presented at Shaping the Future: National Native Title 
Conference, Alice Springs Convention Centre, 3–5 June 2013) 6. 
2  Sue Jackson and Marcia Langton, ‘Trends in the Recognition of Indigenous Water Needs in 
Australian Water Reform: The Limitations of “Cultural” Entitlements in Achieving Water 
Equity’ (2012) 22 Journal of Water Law 109, 110. 
3  See Council of Australian Governments, ‘Intergovernmental Agreement on a National Water 
Initiative’ (Intergovernmental Agreement, 25 June 2004) sch B(i) <http://www.nwc.gov.au>, 
which defines the ‘consumptive pool’ as ‘the amount of water resource that can be made 
available for consumptive use in a given water system under the rules of the relevant water plan’ 
(emphasis in original). 
4  Ibid sch B(i) (definition of ‘consumptive use’). 
5  Glen Sean Coulthard, Red Skin, White Masks: Rejecting the Colonial Politics of Recognition 
(University of Minnesota Press, 2014) 1–2; see Nancy Fraser, ‘From Redistribution to 
Recognition? Dilemmas of Justice in a “Post-Socialist” Age’ (1995) 212 New Left Review 68.  
6  See Kirsty Gover, ‘Legal Pluralism and State-Indigenous Relations in Western Settler Societies’ 
(Working Paper, International Council on Human Rights Policy, 2009) 6. 





rights to land and waters is now provided for in the Native Title Act 1993 (Cth) (‘Native 
Title Act’).8  
 
The need to ‘recognise’ indigenous rights to land and resources is often argued with 
reference to theories of ‘legal pluralism’, on the basis that indigenous rights and law 
exist independently of state law but should be recognised by the state.9 The Australian 
native title recognition model is sometimes described with reference to such ideas,10 
because the origin of native title rights and interests is in traditional laws and customs 
existing at the time of sovereignty.11 However, because reparative justifications 
emphasise a need to recognise rights that were not recognised at the acquisition of 
sovereignty, pre-sovereignty notions of resource use have tended to restrain the legal 
rights they entail.12  
 
The native title recognition model is the only legal mechanism that deals with 
indigenous water rights in Australia in any comprehensive way. Australian water law 
frameworks, in determining rights to access and use water, have relied 
disproportionately on the conception of indigenous water rights under native title. 
However, as explored here, native title law has developed in a particularly narrow way 
through the decisions of the Australian courts and Parliaments. Consequently, rights to 
water may only be recognised in a native title determination where a claimant group 
can prove that it holds such rights pursuant to traditional laws acknowledged and 
traditional customs observed in a substantially uninterrupted manner since pre-
sovereignty times. Further, any recognised rights may only be exercised if third parties 
do not hold water use rights that would be inconsistent with the native title. The result 
is that native title rights to water have tended to be limited to ‘traditional and cultural’ 
water rights that resemble pre-sovereignty water interests. Moreover, these traditional 
and cultural native title rights to water are extinguished or ineffective where other right 
holders have, since colonisation, acquired inconsistent rights.  
 
Despite the limitations of the native title model, some Australian commentators remain 
hopeful that commercial water rights might be recognised as part of a native title 
determination in the future, as native title jurisprudence ‘evolves’ to enable the 
recognition of commercial rights.13 In this article, I use a study of Chilean law to argue 
that it would be preferable to allocate commercial water rights to indigenous 
 
8  Native Title Act s 3. 
9  See, eg, Sébastien Grammond, ‘The Reception of Indigenous Legal Systems in Canada’ in 
Albert Breton et al (eds), Multijuralism: Manifestations, Causes, and Consequences (Ashgate 
Publishing Limited, 2009) 44. See generally Gover, above n 6. 
10  Noel Pearson, ‘The Concept of Native Title at Common Law’ [1997] (5) Australian Humanities 
Review <http://www.australianhumanitiesreview.org/archive/Issue-March-1997/pearson.html>.  
11  Mabo [No 2] (1992) 175 CLR 1, 53, 58 (Brennan J). 
12  See also Duncan Ivison, Paul Patton and Will Sanders, ‘Introduction’ in Duncan Ivison, Paul 
Patton and Will Sanders (eds), Political Theory and the Rights of Indigenous Peoples 
(Cambridge University Press, 2000) 1, 10–11 for a discussion of these limitations in the context 
of traditional cultural conceptions of indigenous rights. 
13  See, eg, Michael O’Donnell, ‘Indigenous Rights in Water in Northern Australia’ (Report, 
Northern Australia Indigenous Land and Sea Management Alliance and Tropical Rivers and 
Coastal Knowledge, March 2011). See also Samantha Hepburn, ‘Native Title Rights in the 
Territorial Sea and Beyond: Exclusivity and Commerce in the Akiba Decision’ (2011) 34(1) 





landholders under a statutory framework, outside of (and supplementary to) the native 
title recognition model. The study is underpinned by in-depth archival research in Chile, 
and interviews with public servants and lawyers administering the Chilean model.  
 
In Chile, a country with similar climatic challenges for water management and a 
comparable history of indigenous-settler tension, legal mechanisms were devised to 
allocate water rights to indigenous landholders, which would, in the Australian context, 
be considered ‘commercial’. As well as providing for the judicial recognition of 
‘ancestral’ water rights in northern Chile,14 in a manner similar to Australian native 
title, Chile’s Indigenous Land and Water Fund finances the acquisition of water use 
rights for indigenous landholders, where necessary by purchasing them in the water 
market.15 The study of this statutory allocation mechanism reveals important lessons 
about how we might provide indigenous groups with commercial water rights in 
Australia. 
 
The article is structured in two parts. In the first part I explore the legal recognition of 
native title rights to water, and the way in which that recognition is translated into water 
law frameworks. I then consider the recognition of ancestral water rights in Chile, 
finding them subject to many of the same limitations as native title in Australia, because 
they focus on water practices originating prior to colonisation that have been 
continuously maintained. In the final part I consider Chile’s mechanism for allocating 
new water rights to indigenous landholders, which both respond to and utilise market 
mechanisms. I consider the potential for a statutory allocation mechanism to provide 
for commercial indigenous water rights in Australia, pointing to a few discrete 
examples where legislation or policy has already been used to allocate commercial 
water rights to indigenous groups. While these examples are limited in their application, 
they transcend the assumption that indigenous water rights must be limited to traditional 
and cultural purposes and demonstrate that commercial indigenous water rights could 
be provided for in Australia outside of the limited native title recognition model. 
 
II EXCLUDING INDIGENOUS PEOPLE FROM WATER LAW 
FRAMEWORKS 
 
A Australian Water Law and Policy: A History of Indigenous Exclusion 
 
Prior to the acquisition of sovereignty, indigenous groups throughout Australia used 
land and water without holding any ‘formal title’.16 It is important to remember that the 
rights exercised by indigenous groups over land and resources, either prior to or after 
sovereignty, may be considered ‘property’ regardless of whether they are recognised 
 
14  Ley No 19.253 Establece Normas sobre Protección, Fomento y Desarrollo de los Indígenas, y 
Crea la Corporación Nacional de Desarrollo Indígena 1993 [Law No 19.253 to 
EstablishNorms for the Protection, Creation and Development of the Indigenous, and to Create 
the National Corporation for Indigenous Development 1993] (Chile) (‘Indigenous Law’) art 64. 
15  Indigenous Law art 20(c). 
16  By ‘formal title’ I mean a property right recognised or allocated by the state. See Michael 
Trebilcock and Paul-Erik Veel, ‘Property Rights and Development: The Contingent Case for 





by the state.17 However, they are usually understood as being distinct from the private 
property (or ‘commodified’) rights to land and resources typically recognised or 
allocated by western governments.18 
 
Since the colonisation of Australia, water rights have been allocated with little or no 
regard for pre-existing indigenous water interests. The British Crown vested in itself 
the sovereign title to all the land and waters of Australia upon the acquisition of 
sovereignty,19 conferring the riparian system of water regulation from the British 
common law, which allowed landholders to make reasonable use of waters running 
through or adjacent to their lands.20 However, neither the British Crown nor subsequent 
Australian governments recognised indigenous-specific rights to land or resources until 
the late 20th century. Indigenous groups in Australia did not typically hold land title, 
and did not, consequently, hold riparian water rights as an incident of landholding.  
 
In the late 19th century, Australian states and territories vested their respective Crowns 
with the right to the ‘use, flow and control’ of surface and ground water,21 and 
implemented a statutory system of water licences and concessions (here called ‘water 
use rights’) to authorise the ‘consumptive use’22 of water.23 Otherwise, landholders 
retained limited rights (often called ‘basic landholder rights’) to use water, including 
for ‘domestic and stock’ purposes, without the need for a licence or concession, which 
were the remnant of common law riparian rights.24 The new statutory water use rights 
were also attached to land, and were intended to support its productive use through 
activities such as irrigated agriculture.25 However, indigenous groups, who still did not 
typically hold land titles, did not enjoy access to statutory water use rights as an incident 
 
17  Lee Godden, ‘Governing Common Resources: Environmental Markets and Property in Water’ 
in Aileen McHarg et al (eds), Property and the Law in Energy and Natural Resources (Oxford 
University Press, 2010) 413. 
18  Jonnette Watson Hamilton and Nigel Bankes, ‘Different Views of the Cathedral: The Literature 
on Property Law Theory’ in Aileen McHarg et al (eds), Property and the Law in Energy and 
Natural Resources (Oxford University Press, 2010) 19, 32–5. 
19  Whether sovereignty was in fact acquired is beyond the scope of this article. See Linda Popic, 
‘Sovereignty in Law: The Justiciability of Indigenous Sovereignty in Australia, the United 
States and Canada’ (2005) 4 Indigenous Law Journal 117. 
20  Jennifer McKay, ‘The Legal Frameworks of Australian Water: Progression from Common Law 
Rights to Sustainable Shares’ in Lin Crase (ed), Water Policy in Australia: The Impact of 
Change and Uncertainty (Resources for the Future, 2008) 44, 46. 
21  The first of these was The Irrigation Act 1886 (Vic), which in its s 4 vested all water in the 
Crown and substantially abrogated riparian water rights. The vesting clauses are recorded today 
in the Water Management Act 2000 (NSW) s 392; Water Act 2000 (Qld) s 26; Water Act 1989 
(Vic) s 7; Rights in Water and Irrigation Act 1914 (WA) s 5A; Water Resources Act 2007 
(ACT) s 7; Water Act 1992 (NT) s 9.  
22  The ‘consumptive use’ of water in Australian water law frameworks is defined as the ‘use of 
water for private benefit consumptive purposes including irrigation, industry, urban and stock 
and domestic use’: Council of Australian Governments, ‘National Water Initiative’, above n 3, 
sch B(i). 
23  See generally B Evans and P Howsam, ‘A Critical Analysis of the Riparian Rights of Water 
Abstractors within England and Wales’ (2005) 16(3) Journal of Water Law 90. 
24  See, eg, the limited domestic and stock rights preserved in the Water Management Act 2000 
(NSW) s 52, which do not require a water access entitlement. Similar provisions apply in other 
Australian jurisdictionsWater Act 1989 (Vic) s 8; Water Act 2000 (Qld) s 96; Rights in Water 
and Irrigation Act 1914 (WA) ss 10, 16, 21. 
25  See B R Davidson, Australia: Wet or Dry? The Physical and Economic Limits to the Expansion 





of landholding, and could not, therefore, lawfully make use of water on or adjacent to 
their traditional territories.26 Meanwhile, non-indigenous landholders continued to 
accumulate water use rights to support Australia’s agricultural expansion.  
 
It was not until the end of the 20th century that Australian governments began to 
recognise and allocate land titles for indigenous groups. This took the form, firstly, of 
indigenous land rights legislation in certain Australian states and territories that granted 
land titles to indigenous groups, beginning with the Aboriginal Land Rights (Northern 
Territory) Act 1976 (Cth). Then, with the Mabo [No 2] decision, the recognition of 
native title, subsequently regulated in the Native Title Act. Importantly, the recognition 
and allocation of indigenous-specific land rights to indigenous groups coincided with 
water law reforms implemented in Australian states from the early 1990s,27 whereby 
water use rights began to be unbundled from land titles, now enshrined in the 2004 
Intergovernmental Agreement on a National Water Initiative (‘National Water 
Initiative’).28 The water law reforms adopted an ‘integrated-market’ model of water 
regulation, premised upon a mixture of centralised water planning and trade in water 
use rights that were now defined as ‘water access entitlements’ and could be transferred 
separately from landholding.29 
 
The unbundling of water use rights was intended to encourage the more efficient, and 
productive, use of water through increased competition.30 However, the detachment of 
water use rights from landholding reinforced indigenous exclusion from water law 
frameworks, for two reasons. First, even if indigenous groups belatedly obtained land 
rights they would not (as a matter of water law) acquire the right to use water on those 
lands in the manner they might have had their land rights been recognised or allocated 
prior to unbundling. If the land rights of indigenous groups had been recognised at the 
acquisition of sovereignty, for example, they would have acquired riparian water use 
rights, and could later have converted the riparian rights to state-based water licences 
and concessions, which also attached to land title. Unbundling also made water use 
rights available for purchase in water markets, independent of landholding, meaning 




26  But see Sue Jackson and Jon Altman, ‘Indigenous Rights and Water Policy: Perspectives from 
Tropical Northern Australia’ (2009) 13(1) Australian Indigenous Law Review 27, 36. According 
to Jackson and Altman, in some remote areas of Australia where the state has little involvement 
in water regulation indigenous groups have continued (despite a lack of state sanctioned water 
rights) to use water for hunting, fishing and foraging as well as other non-subsistence or market 
uses.  
27  Council of Australian Governments, ‘Communique – Attachment A, Water Resource Policy’ 
(25 February 1994) 
<http://webarchive.nla.gov.au/gov/20041031065143/http://www.coag.gov.au/meetings/250294/
attachment_a.htm>.  
28  Council of Australian Governments, ‘National Water Initiative’, above n 3. 
29  Ibid [28]–[34]; ‘water access entitlements’ are defined as ‘a perpetual or open-ended share of 
the consumptive pool of a specified water resource, as determined by the relevant water plan’ 
(emphasis in original): at [28]. 
30  D E Fisher, ‘Markets, Water Rights and Sustainable Development’ (2006) 23 Environmental 





Today, the states primarily determine who may and may not take and use water, and 
regulate the way in which they do so, under the overall policy approach set by the 
National Water Initiative.31 This is done via water legislation and corresponding water 
resource plans, which set out the amount of water that can be taken from particular 
water resources for a range of purposes. The National Water Initiative divides the 
regulation of water resources between ‘consumptive uses’ (meaning the ‘use of water 
for private benefit consumptive purposes including irrigation, industry, urban and stock 
and domestic use’)32 and ‘environmental and other public benefit outcomes’.33 Those 
who wish to use water for consumptive purposes must hold a ‘water access 
entitlement’,34 with a few statutory exceptions where water may be used ‘as of right’ 
(‘basic landholder rights’), most commonly for ‘domestic or stock’ purposes.35  
 
The National Water Initiative makes it clear that only ‘[w]ater allocated to native title 
holders for traditional cultural purposes will be accounted for’.36 Accordingly, state-
based water legislation and water resource plans usually treat indigenous water interests 
as being covered by environmental or cultural flows,37 or ‘basic landholder’ rights38 
(neither of which was designed with indigenous interests in mind). Such entitlements 
are not represented by a ‘water access entitlement’ and cannot be used for consumptive 
purposes.39 Only in the case of New South Wales does water legislation specifically 
provide for the allocation of water use rights to indigenous groups40 and the lack of 
progress has been criticised by the former National Water Commission.41  
 
 
31  See also Water Act 2007 (Cth); Basin Plan 2012 (Cth). In Australia’s largest water catchment, 
the Murray Darling Basin, the Commonwealth has implemented specific water legislation and a 
basin-wide water resource plan providing binding limits on the quantity of water that may be 
taken from the Basin and binding requirements for water resource plans: Water Act 2007 (Cth) s 
43A; Basin Plan 2012 (Cth). 
32  Council of Australian Governments, ‘National Water Initiative’, above n 3, sch B(i). 
33  Ibid [35]. 
34  The National Water Initiative requires state water planning frameworks to provide for a ‘water 
access entitlement, separate from land, to be described as a perpetual or open-ended share of the 
consumptive pool of a specified water resource, as determined by the relevant water plan’, the 
allocation of water to the water use right being provided for in a water resource plan: ibid [28]–
[34]. 
35  See above n 24. 
36  Council of Australian Governments, ‘National Water Initiative’, above n 3, [54]. Similarly, the 
Murray Darling Basin’s Basin Plan 2012 (Cth) provides that indigenous water values and uses 
are ‘social, spiritual and cultural’: Basin Plan 2012 (Cth) s 10.52(2). 
37  Sue Jackson, ‘Background Paper on Indigenous Participation in Water Planning and Access to 
Water’ (CSIRO and National Water Commission, February 2009) 5. 
38  See generally Poh-Ling Tan, ‘A Review of the Legal Basis for Indigenous Access to 
Water’(Report prepared for the National Water Commission, 2009) 15–16. Tan discusses the 
categorisation of native title rights as ‘basic landholder rights’ under the Water Management Act 
2000 (NSW). 
39  See, eg, Water Sharing Plan for the Coffs Harbour Area Unregulated and Alluvial Water 
Sources 2009 (NSW) reg 19. 
40  Water Management Act 2000 (NSW) ss 56, 57(2); Water Management (General) Regulation 
2011 (NSW) sch 3 cl 4(2). 
41  National Water Commission, ‘A Review of Indigenous Involvement in Water Planning, 2013’ 







The ‘shoehorning’ of indigenous water interests into ‘environmental and public benefit’ 
outcomes or ‘domestic and stock’ rights differentiates them from substantive water use 
rights that take from the ‘consumptive pool’. This differentiation is unlikely to be 
accidental, as it minimises conflict between indigenous and other interests. Yet, by 
failing to provide indigenous Australians with a share of the consumptive pool, 
Australian water law and policy does not adequately address water rights distribution. 
Other right holders continue to hold almost all water use rights, and indigenous groups 
hold very few.  
 
B Indigenous Exclusion from Water Law Frameworks in Chile 
 
As was the case in Australia, indigenous groups in Chile42 were excluded from laws 
that authorised water use as an incident of landholding from the Spanish acquisition of 
sovereignty43 until the late 20th century, because indigenous groups did not typically 
have recognised or granted land titles during that period.44 Since 1855 water resources 
in Chile have been publically vested as ‘bienes nacionales de uso público’ (national 
goods for public use), in a similar manner as occurred in Australian states.45 This 
enabled governments to allocate water rights with little or no regard for the pre-existing 
water use of indigenous communities. 
 
Also like Australia, Chile began to respond to indigenous claims for land and resource 
rights from the late 20th century, with its Indigenous Law, passed the same year as the 
Native Title Act. However, because water use rights had been unbundled from land titles 
ten years earlier in water reforms that adopted a similar ‘integrated-market’ logic,46 
indigenous landholders who acquired land titles under the Indigenous Law would not 
automatically enjoy the right to use water on their lands as a matter of water law.  
 
In the early 1980s Chilean water law frameworks underwent substantial reform, with 
the introduction of an ‘integrated-market’ approach to water regulation and a new Water 
Code 1981.47 Chilean water law reform was part of a wider project of neoliberal reform 
implemented by the military dictatorship across a range of sectors, and was 
accompanied by rapid growth in water-related development such as mining and 
 
42  The indigenous population of Chile is approximately 11 per cent of the total population: 
Instituto Nacional de Estadísticas Chile, ‘Censo 2012: Resultados XVIII Censo de Población’ 
[Census 2012: Results of the 18th Population Census] (Report, 30 June 2012) 172. 
43  See generally Robert J Miller, Lisa LeSage and Sebastián López Escarcena, ‘The International 
Law of Discovery, Indigenous Peoples, and Chile’ (2011) 89 Nebraska Law Review 819, 850–3. 
44  René Kuppe, ‘The Three Dimensions of the Rights of Indigenous Peoples’ (2009) 11 
International Community Law Review 103, 108. 
45  Código Civil 1855 [Civil Code 1855] (Chile) art 595; Código de Aguas 1951 [Water Code 1951] 
(Chile) art 12. Now reflected in the Código de Aguas 1981 [Water Code 1981] (Chile) art 5 
(‘Water Code’). 
46  Decreto Ley 2.603 Modifica y Complementa Acta Constitucional N° 3; y Establece Normas 
sobre Derechos de Aprovechamiento de Aguas y Facultades para el Establecimiento del 
Régimen General de las Aguas 1979 [Decree Law 2.603 to Modify and Complement 
Constitutional Act 3; and to Establish Rules about Water Rights and Arrangements for the 
Establishment of a General Water Regime 1979] (Chile) (‘Decree Law 2.603 1979 (Chile)’) art 
3. 





hydroelectricity.48 The new approach combined centralised water regulation with trade 
in unbundled derechos de aprovechamiento in water markets.  
 
The unbundling of water use rights (called ‘derechos de aprovechamiento’) from land 
titles in Chile also intensified indigenous exclusion from water law frameworks. Since 
the reform few indigenous groups have acquired derechos de aprovechamiento via the 
processes set out in the Water Code because indigenous communities had limited 
knowledge of the mechanisms and limited finance for legal and administrative 
processes,49 and due to widespread indigenous dispossession and urbanisation.50 The 
Water Code allows three ways in which a person can acquire a derecho de 
aprovechamiento: via the constitution of a new right as an administrative act pursuant 
to article 20;51 via the judicial ‘regularisation’ of unregistered (‘customary’) water use 
under transitory article 2;52 or by private bargaining in water markets.53  
 
The regularisation process has been commonly used by small-scale agricultural water 
users (indigenous or otherwise) to obtain recognition of historical, ‘customary’ water 
use. However, it was not possible for indigenous Chileans to regularise communal water 
use rights prior to the Indigenous Law as they did not enjoy legal personality separate 
to their individual members.54 Some indigenous groups in the region of Antofagasta 
acquired derechos de aprovechamiento as water associations using the general 
regularisation provisions of the Water Code prior to 1993.55 However, members of 
 
48  See generally Carl J Bauer, Siren Song: Chilean Water Law as a Model for International 
Reform (Resources for the Future, 2004) 4; Arne Ruckert, ‘Towards an Inclusive-Neoliberal 
Regime of Development: From the Washington to the Post-Washington Consensus’ (2006) 
39(1) Labour, Capital and Society 34, 42–3. 
49  See Jessica Budds, ‘The 1981 Water Code: The Impacts of Private Tradeable Water Rights on 
Peasant and Indigenous Communities in Northern Chile’ in William L Alexander (ed), Lost in 
the Long Transition: Struggles for Social Justice in Neoliberal Chile (Lexington Books, 2009) 
41, 54; Interview with Daniela Rivera (Santiago, 22 November 2011); Comisión Especial 
Pueblos Indígenas, ‘Primer Informe Comisión Especial Pueblos Indígenas’ [First Report of the 
Special Commission for Indigenous Peoples] (10 November 1992), in Biblioteca del Congreso 
Nacional de Chile (ed), ‘Historia de la Ley No 19.253: Establece Normas sobre Protección, 
Fomento y Desarrollo de los Indígenas y Crea la Corporación Nacional de Desarrollo Indígena’ 
[History of Law No 19.253 to Establish Norms for the Protection, Creation and Development of 
the Indigenous, and to Create the National Corporation of Indigenous Development] (Biblioteca 
del Congreso Nacional de Chile, 5 October 1993) 43, 64; Bauer, above n 488, 94–5; Interview 
with Manuel Prieto (Santiago, 4 September 2013). 
50  See D Solís and A Luis, ‘Memoria: Comisión Especial de Pueblos Indígenas’ [Memoir: Special 
Commission for Indigenous Peoples] (Report, Comisión Especial de Pueblos Indígenas, 1993) 
19–20, 30–39 for a discussion of the impacts of indigenous urbanisation.  
51  Alejandro Vergara Blanco, Derecho de Aguas [Water Law] (Editorial Jurídica de Chile, 1998) 
vol 2, 322–6. 
52  See generally ibid 327. 
53  See ibid 315. 
54  Solís and Luis, above n 50, 32. Water Code art 5, which provides that ‘particulares’ 
[individuals] can hold derechos de aprovechamiento. Carolina de Lourdes Riquelme Salazar, El 
Derecho al Uso Privativo de las Aguas en España y Chile: Un Estudio de Derecho Comparado 
[Exclusive Water Rights in Spain and Chile: A Comparative Law Study] (PhD Thesis, 
Universitat Rovira I Virgili, 2013) 240, explains that the concept of ‘particulares’ encompasses 
natural and legal persons acting in the private realm. 
55  See, eg, Conservador de Bienes Raíces y Comercio de Tocopilla [Real Estate and Business 






water associations exercised water rights in an individual manner,56 and any one 
individual could alienate their ‘shares’ in a water association without the consent of the 
other members.57 Consequently, many indigenous communities were wary of the 
mechanism.58  
 
Once derechos de aprovechamiento were available for purchase separate from 
landholding in water markets, other right holders began to acquire rights to use water 
resources on or affecting indigenous owned or occupied lands.59 Encroachment by other 
right holders was aided by Chile’s rapid growth in water-related development such as 
mining and hydroelectricity during the military dictatorship, and increased competition 
for water in water markets.60 Where other right holders sought water use rights via the 
mechanisms of constitution or regularisation, the relevant administrative and judicial 
bodies did not account for water use by indigenous groups, which was not recorded.61 
The processes for public notification and objection of new applications for derechos de 
aprovechamiento under the Water Code were little help, as few indigenous groups had 
access to the Official Gazette, radio or even local newspapers.62  
 
By the end of the 1980s, it was uncommon for indigenous groups in Chile to hold 
derechos de aprovechamiento and other right holders held almost all of the water use 
rights in Chile.63 This unfair distribution, leaving many indigenous groups with 
indigenous-specific land rights but no right to use the water on the land, was a similar 
predicament to that facing indigenous-specific landholders in Australia today.  
 
III NATIVE TITLE AND WATER RIGHTS RECOGNITION IN 
AUSTRALIA 
 
It is clear that rights to water may be recognised in Australia’s native title process,64 in 
either of two ways.65 One of these ways is section 211 of the Native Title Act, which 
 
Community ‘Second Canal of Quillagua’], Regularisation decision 619/155, 10 December 1986. 
See Interview with Manuel Prieto (Santiago, 4 September 2013); Water Code arts 187–282. The 
various water associations are ‘comunidades de aguas’, ‘asociaciones de canalistas’ and ‘juntas 
de vigilancia’. 
56  Water Code art 193.  
57  Comisión Especial Pueblos Indígenas, above n 49, 64. 
58  See Manuel Prieto, Privatizing Water and Articulating Indigeneity: The Chilean Water Reforms 
and the Atacameño People (Likan Antai) (PhD Thesis, University of Arizona, 2014) 201–4. 
59 The Water Code did in arts 131–3 provide for public notification and objection processes where 
other right holders sought to create or regularise water use rights.  
60  See generally Budds, ‘The 1981 Water Code’, above n 49, for a discussion of the impacts of 
water markets and economic expansion indigenous and peasant water rights during this period. 
61  It was only after 1992 that the General Water Directorate began to keep track of water rights 
that were ‘regularisable’: see Vergara Blanco, above n 51, 348. 
62  Water Code arts 131–3. 
63  Comisión Especial Pueblos Indígenas, above n 49, 64–5.  
64  Mabo [No 2] (1992) 175 CLR 1, 58 (Brennan J); Native Title Act s 223(1). 
65  Where native title holders have obtained a determination of native title rights to land to the 
exclusion of all others, they have also been recognised as holding an accompanying right to 
make decisions about access to and use of land and waters, although only to the extent that this 
is not inconsistent with the rights and interests of others granted under legislation (including the 
water use rights held by other users) which take priority over native title rights. In any event, 






allows native titleholders limited rights to access water in exercise or enjoyment of their 
native title rights and interests without a water license or permit. However, section 211 
expressly excludes the use of water for commercial purposes. The other way is as part 
of a determination of native title rights and interests by a court under section 225 of the 
Act. 
 
Both the Native Title Act and its interpretation by the courts have led to a number of 
limitations being placed on native title rights to water. ‘Native title rights and interests’ 
have been characterised as a ‘bundle of rights’, ranging from a right of exclusive 
possession to limited use rights.66 However, rights to ‘own’67 water cannot be one of 
the ‘sticks in the bundle’68 because section 223(1)(c) of the Native Title Act provides 
that native title rights and interests must be ‘recognised by the common law of 
Australia’,69 and the common law does not allow ownership of water in its natural 
state.70 Further, the courts have held that native title rights to water cannot be exclusive, 
as exclusive rights would be inconsistent with the legislative vesting of the right to the 
control and use of water in the Crown.71 
 
Admittedly, the impossibility for native title rights to water to be rights of ‘ownership’ 
does not (in and of itself) limit the potential for native title rights to water to be 
recognised or exercised for commercial purposes. The Australian courts have not been 
prepared to characterise any water use rights as rights of ownership, although the water 
use rights held by other right holders are often allocated and exercisable for commercial 
purposes. Nevertheless, there are two problems with the native title recognition model 
for water rights, which undermine the potential to establish and exercise native title 
rights to water for commercial purposes. The first is a threshold requirement for native 
 
entitlement to access and use water. See, eg, Northern Territory v Alyawarr, Kaytetye, 
Warumungu, Wakaya Native Title Claim Group (2005) 145 FCR 442, 504–7 (The Court). 
66  Western Australia v Ward (2002) 213 CLR 1, 95 [95] (Gleeson CJ, Gaudron, Gummow and 
Hayne JJ); Yanner v Eaton (1999) 201 CLR 351, 365–71 [17]–[31] (Gleeson CJ, Gaudron, 
Kirby and Hayne JJ). 
67  In Yanner v Eaton (1999) 201 CLR 351, 368 [25] (Gleeson CJ, Gaudron, Kirby and Hayne JJ), 
‘“[o]wnership” connotes a legal right to have and to dispose of possession and enjoyment of the 
subject matter’.  
68  The inability of native title to recognise ownership rights in water is sometimes made explicit in 
native title determinations. See, eg, Kaurareg People v Queensland [2001] FCA 657 QG 6024, 
O 8 (Drummond J): ‘Notwithstanding anything in this determination, the Native Title Rights 
and Interests do not confer on Native Title Holders rights of ownership in respect of flowing 
water’. 
69  See Commonwealth v Yarmirr (2001) 208 CLR 1, 49 [42] (Gleeson CJ, Gaudron, Gummow and 
Hayne JJ), explaining that ‘recognise’ in this context means that the common law ‘will, by the 
ordinary processes of law and equity, give remedies in support of the relevant rights and 
interests to those who hold them’.  
70  ICM Agriculture v Commonwealth (2009) 240 CLR 140, 173–4 [55]–[57] (French CJ, 
Gummow and Crennan JJ).  
71  Western Australia v Ward (2002) 213 CLR 1, 152 [263] (Gleeson CJ, Gaudron, Gummow and 
Hayne JJ). Native title determinations usually confirm that native title rights to water are non-
exclusive. See, eg, Brooks on behalf of the Mamu People v Queensland [No 4] [2013] FCA 
1453 QUD 6014, O 8 (Dowsett J):  
Subject to paragraphs 10, 11 and 12 below the nature and extent of the native title rights and 
interests in relation to the land and waters described in Part 1 of Schedule 1 are: …  
b) in relation to Water, the non-exclusive rights to: …  
(iii) take and use the Water of the area, for personal, domestic and non-





title rights to be evidenced by traditional laws and customs (a ‘problem of continuity’). 
The second (a ‘problem of priority’) is produced by provisions of the Native Title Act 
dealing with the grant of inconsistent rights in water to third parties, which renders 
native title water rights that can be recognised ineffective.  
 
A The Problem of Continuity 
 
When the Court in Mabo [No 2] recognised the continuance of native title over land 
and water, it also introduced the idea that native title rights will only be recognised 
where a group has continued to acknowledge their traditional laws or observe their 
traditional customs providing for land and water rights since pre-sovereignty times.72 
This idea of ‘continuity’ is reflected in section 223 of the Native Title Act, which 
requires that native title rights and interests in land or waters be (now) ‘possessed under 
the traditional laws acknowledged, and the traditional customs observed, by the 
Aboriginal peoples or Torres Strait Islanders’.73 Further, it requires that ‘the Aboriginal 
peoples or Torres Strait Islanders, by those laws and customs, have a connection with 
the land or waters’. The application of section 223 in the Australian jurisprudence has 
produced two concerns with respect to continuity.74 The first is whether traditional laws 
and customs must be continuously acknowledged or observed since pre-sovereignty 
times. The second is whether the laws and customs can adapt or change since pre-
sovereignty times and still be considered to be ‘traditional’.  
 
The High Court of Australia in Members of the Yorta Yorta Aboriginal Community v 
Victoria (‘Yorta Yorta’)75 confirmed that section 223 requires a native title applicant to 
particularise the traditional laws and customs establishing their native title right. Those 
laws and customs must have been ‘acknowledged and observed by the ancestors of the 
claimants at the time of sovereignty’.76 Further, the acknowledgement and observance 
of those laws and customs must have continued ‘substantially uninterrupted since 
sovereignty’, being passed down ‘from generation to generation’.77 
 
Even in the case of land, it is very difficult for indigenous groups to prove the content 
of pre-sovereignty traditional laws and customs establishing their rights some 200 years 
later.78 Proving that those traditional laws and customs have been acknowledged and 
observed, in a substantially uninterrupted manner, since the acquisition of sovereignty 
is also difficult. Because rights to use water were an incident of landholding until the 
end of the 20th century, indigenous people may have been unable to continue to 
acknowledge traditional laws or observe traditional customs authorising water use 
 
72  Mabo [No 2] (1992) 175 CLR 1, 59–60 (Brennan J). See generally Simon Young, The Trouble 
with Tradition: Native Title and Cultural Change (Federation Press, 2008). 
73  Members of the Yorta Yorta Aboriginal Community v Victoria (2002) 214 CLR 422, 444–5 [47] 
(Gleeson CJ, Gummow and Hayne JJ).  
74  Australian Law Reform Commission, Connection to Country: Review of the Native Title Act 
1993 (Cth), Report No 126 (2015) 19. 
75  (2002) 214 CLR 422. 
76  Ibid 456 [87] (Gleeson CJ, Gummow and Hayne JJ). 
77  Ibid. 
78  Anne Hewitt, ‘Commercial Exploitation of Native Title Rights – A Possible Tool in the Quest 






where their access was prevented by the rights of adjacent landholders.79 The High 
Court has stressed that a physical connection is not necessarily required in order to 
satisfy the requirement in section 223(1)(b) that the native titleholders, by their pre-
sovereignty laws and customs, ‘have a connection with the land or waters’.80 Yet, it 
would certainly be harder to prove connection to particular waters, pursuant to 
traditional laws and customs authorising water use at the acquisition of sovereignty, 
where water resources are no longer used by the claimant. 
 
The requirement that laws and customs establishing indigenous water interests be 
passed down generation to generation in a substantially uninterrupted manner presents 
particular challenges for claims for commercial water rights. The use of water for 
commercial purposes may be quite different from the use of water by indigenous groups 
in pre-sovereignty times, raising a question of whether the use of water for commercial 
purposes derives from pre-sovereignty traditional laws and customs.81  
 
B The Problem of Priority 
 
Even if native title rights to water can be established for commercial purposes, the 
Native Title Act provides for their extinguishment or ineffectiveness to the extent of any 
inconsistency with rights granted to other users.82  
 
In 1975 the Racial Discrimination Act 1975 (Cth) commenced, guaranteeing to 
indigenous Australians ‘immunity from legislative interference with their enjoyment of 
their human right to own and inherit property as it clothes other persons in the 
community’, and entitling them to consultation or compensation for the extinguishment 
of native title rights and interests after 1975.83 As a consequence of the recognition of 
native title rights and interests by the Australian courts in Mabo [No 2], the grant of 
inconsistent rights to others after 1975 could be rendered invalid because of its 
discriminatory impact on native title. However, many water users legally acquired 
water use rights prior to 1975, meaning that native title rights to water will have been 
extinguished, without the need for consultation or compensation.84 
 
In response to public concern around the uncertainty produced by the recognition of 
native title in Mabo [No 2] on other right holders, the Native Title Act established a 
complicated regime to determine the impact of the grant of inconsistent rights (called 
 
79  See Jackson and Langton, above n 2, 112 discussing the challenges for retaining customary 
connections and attaining recognition posed by this ‘chronological possession of land and water 
rights’. 
80  De Rose v South Australia [No 2] (2005) 145 FCR 290, 306 [62] (The Court). 
81  Yorta Yorta (2002) 214 CLR 422, 455 [83] (Gleeson CJ, Gummow and Hayne JJ). 
82  See Akiba v Commonwealth (2013) 250 CLR 209, 237 [52] (Hayne, Kiefel and Bell JJ) 
(emphasis in original): ‘inconsistency of rights lies at the heart of any question of 
extinguishment’; Western Australia v Ward (2002) 213 CLR 1, 136 [215] (Gleeson CJ, 
Gaudron, Gummow, and Hayne JJ). 
83  Mabo v Queensland [No 1] (1988) 166 CLR 186, 218–19 (Brennan, Toohey and Gaudron JJ). 
See generally Maureen Tehan, ‘A Hope Disillusioned, an Opportunity Lost? Reflections on 
Common Law Native Title and Ten Years of the Native Title Act’ (2003) 27 Melbourne 
University Law Review 523. 
84  See Western Australia v Ward (2002) 213 CLR 1, 152 [263]–[265] (Gleeson CJ, Gaudron, 





‘acts’) on native title.85 Generally, the grant of inconsistent water rights to third parties 
extinguishes native title or confirms that the third party grants are valid despite their 
impact on native title, with compensation sometimes payable.86 
 
The Native Title Act includes specific provisions that validate third party water interests 
granted since 1993 and into the future,87 which were inserted into the future acts regime 
in 1998 in response to concerns about the certainty of third party rights and interests 
after the decision in Wik Peoples v Queensland.88 Although native title rights which are 
inconsistent with such future acts are not extinguished, the native title is ‘prevailed 
over’89 by the inconsistent water use rights, leaving only a right to compensation.90 In 
the case of ‘fully allocated’ water resources, including in Australia’s largest water 
catchment, the Murray Darling Basin, commercial native title rights to water would 
probably be overridden by the inconsistent water legislation and water use rights under 
it.91 
 
The cumulative effect of the continuity and priority problems on native title rights to 
water is that the native title process formalises water interests based on traditional laws 
and customs that have continued to be acknowledged and observed by indigenous 
groups and where rights to use the resource have not been allocated to third parties. As 
noted by Williams, this outcome is ‘perverse’, because it requires native title applicants 
to pretend that they have not been historically excluded from land and resource rights 
in order to obtain recognition.92 It requires them to prove that they have continued to 
enjoy relationships with water resources of which they have been dispossessed.  
 
C The Evolution of Native Title? 
 
In not one of the approximately 350 determinations of native title since Mabo [No 2] 
has an Australian court or tribunal expressly recognised a right to use water for 
commercial purposes.93 Determinations typically restrict any native title rights to water 
 
85  Native Title Act ss 24JA, 24KA, 24HA(4),(5), 238, 24HA(7). See generally Gardner, Bartlett 
and Gray, below n 257. 
86  See Michael O’Donnell, ‘Briefing Paper for the Water Rights Project by the Lingiari Foundation 
and ATSIC’ in Background Briefing Papers (Lingiari Foundation, February 2002) 95, 104 
<http://pandora.nla.gov.au/pan/41033/20060106-
0000/ATSIC/issues/Indigenous_Rights/Indigenous_Rights_Waters/docs/layout_papers.pdf>. 
87  Native Title Act ss 24HA, 44H. 
88  (1996) 187 CLR 1. See generally Garth Nettheim, ‘The Search for Certainty and the Native Title 
Amendment Act 1998 (Cth)’ (1999) 22 University of New South Wales Law Journal 564, 571–2; 
Tehan, above n 83, 552–6. 
89  Native Title Act s 24AA(7). 
90  Native Title Act s 24HA(5).  
91  Australian water law frameworks make a distinction between water resources that are fully 
allocated (where with full development of water access entitlements in relation to a particular 
water resource, the total volume of water able to be extracted by entitlement holders at a given 
time reaches the environmentally sustainable level of extraction for that system) and under 
allocated water resources. See Council of Australian Governments, ‘National Water Initiative’, 
above n 3, sch B(i) (definition of ‘overallocation’). 
92  Joe Williams, ‘Confessions of a Native Judge: Reflections on the Role of Transitional Justice in 
the Transformation of Indigeneity’ (Issue Paper No 14, Australian Institute of Aboriginal and 
Torres Strait Islander Studies, June 2008) 8–9. 
93  National Native Title Tribunal, National Native Title Register <http://www.nntt.gov.au> (I 





to ‘personal, domestic and non-commercial communal purposes’.94 Some 
commentators predict that indigenous groups may be recognised as having a right to 
use various resources for any (including commercial) purposes as part of evolving 
native title jurisprudence concerning a ‘right to trade’,95 following the High Court of 
Australia’s 2013 decision in Akiba v Commonwealth (‘Akiba’).96 The Court in Akiba 
held that native title rights to take fish in offshore waters for any purposes were not 
extinguished by Queensland fisheries legislation prohibiting the taking of fish for 
commercial purposes without a licence.97 Akiba was followed in two 2014 Federal 
Court decisions by North J, which emphasised that establishing a right to take resources 
for trade required establishing that the claim group has a right under traditional laws 
and customs to access and take resources for any purpose in the application area.98 
These cases confirm that it is not necessary to prove that activity in conformity with 
traditional laws and customs has taken place in order to establish that a right exists, 
although proof of activities undertaken pursuant to laws and customs will assist in 
proving the existence of the right.99 Rather, the group has to prove the existence of 
traditional laws and customs that would give them such a right, even if there were no 
evidence provided of actual trading activity.100  
 
While Akiba and the decisions of North J are welcome developments for Australian 
native title jurisprudence, none of the decisions directly concerned rights to water, nor 
do they secure the future recognition of commercial native title rights,101 for two 
reasons.  
 
First, because of the problem of continuity, an applicant seeking commercial water 
rights via the native title recognition model still needs to establish a right to take and 
use water, for any purpose, under traditional (meaning pre-sovereignty) laws and 
customs. This is a question of fact, which must be proved.102 Yet, many indigenous 
groups have ceased to acknowledge and observe traditional laws and customs providing 
 
94  See, eg, Lampton on behalf of the Juru People v Queensland [2014] FCA 736 QUD 554, O 7 
(Rares J). In contrast, the Canadian aboriginal title jurisprudence allows for native title to be 
held generally for non-traditional purposes. See Tsilhqot’in Nation v British Colombia [2014] 2 
SCR 257, 291–2 [67] (Vickers J).  
95  See, eg, O’Donnell, ‘Indigenous Rights’, above n 13. Note that most of the determinations 
recognising a ‘right to trade’, or a right to take resources for any purpose were negotiated 
agreements between the parties as consent determinations rather than litigated determinations. 
The Federal Court in BP (deceased) v Western Australia [2014] FCA 715 casts doubt on the 
precedent value of previous native title determinations reached by consent, stating, ‘[t]hose 
determinations reflect the outcome of negotiations which doubtless involved compromises on all 
sides and responded to the interests rather than the rights of the parties’: at [98] (North J). 
96  (2013) 250 CLR 209. The interpretation of the Akiba decision is not aided by its brevity. See 
Lauren Butterly, ‘Unfinished Business in the Straits: Akiba v Commonwealth of Australia 
[2013] HCA 33’ (2013) 8(8) Indigenous Law Bulletin 3, 5. 
97  Akiba (2013) 250 CLR 209, 241 [65] (Hayne, Kiefel and Bell JJ). 
98  BP (deceased) v Western Australia [2014] FCA 715 (‘BP’); Willis v Western Australia [2014] 
FCA 714 (‘Willis’). 
99  BP [2014] FCA 715, [89]; Willis [2014] FCA 714, [118]. 
100  BP [2014] FCA 715, [89]–[90]; Willis [2014] FCA 714, [119]. 
101  See also Butterly, above n 96, 5 arguing that the significance of the Akiba decision even in terms 
of commercial fishing rights remains unclear, pointing out that the judgment does not require 
the relevant states to allocate (or reallocate) any commercial fishing rights to native title 
claimants, and subjecting any native title rights to fish to the future acts regime. 





for water use since pre-sovereignty times, including where they have been prevented 
from continuing to exercise their rights to use water by the allocation of inconsistent 
land title and water use rights to third parties.103 
 
Akiba, and the following decisions, stand for the proposition that evidence of pre-
sovereignty commercial activities is not necessary to establish a right to take and use 
resources for any purposes.104 However, the Court acknowledges that evidence of such 
activities ‘focuses attention on the right’105 and helps to establish the existence of the 
right.106 In these cases, substantial anthropological and historical evidence was led in 
support of a native title right to access and take resources for any purposes. However, 
the extent to which that evidence concerned ‘commercial’ purposes was more limited 
than I use here, relating to exchange and sale of the resources themselves.107 For 
example, in one case, anthropological and historical evidence was led about traditional 
rights to ‘trade in ochre, shell, grindstones, ground stone axes, stone knives, wooden 
implements and tobacco’.108 There have been no native title cases in which evidence 
has been led about a native title right, arising from pre-sovereignty traditional laws and 
customs, to take and use water for commercial purposes like irrigation or industry. 
  
Secondly, even if a native title right to take and use water for any purposes can be made 
out, it would be non-exercisable where inconsistent with water legislation and the grant 
of water use rights to other users under the future acts regime of the Native Title Act.109 
While the use of water for traditional and cultural purposes may not be inconsistent 
with the water use rights held by third parties, the consumptive use of water for 
commercial activities on indigenous-specific lands such as irrigation, agriculture, 
industry or tourism would likely be inconsistent with water use rights held by others. 
Given the scarce and highly contested nature of water resources in Australia, native title 
rights to water for commercial purposes would, in many areas, conflict with other water 
use rights and therefore be extinguished or non-exercisable.  
 
The Court in Akiba also made it clear that while a native title right to take and use 
resources for any purpose may be recognised, it will still be subject to regulation by the 
state.110 This means that native titleholders cannot use their rights for commercial 
purposes without the necessary licences or permits under state water law frameworks.  
The limited statutory rights native titleholders hold to use water in enjoyment of their 
native title rights and interests without the need for a water use right expressly exclude 
the use of water for commercial purposes. 
 
 
103  See Yanner v Eaton (1999) 201 CLR 351, 373 [38] (Gleeson CJ, Gaudron, Kirby and Hayne JJ): 
‘[r]egulating particular aspects of the usufructuary relationship with traditional land does not 
sever the connection of the Aboriginal peoples concerned with the land (whether or not 
prohibiting the exercise of that relationship altogether might, or might to some extent)’ 
(emphasis added). 
104  See, eg, BP [2014] FCA 715, [90]. 
105  Akiba (2013) 250 CLR 209, 242 [68] (Hayne, Kiefel and Bell JJ).  
106  BP [2014] FCA 715, [89]; Willis [2014] FCA 714, [118]. See generally Australian Law Reform 
Commission, above n 74, 243 about the crucial role of evidence in native title determinations. 
107  See, eg, Willis [2014] FCA 714, [116], [120], [123] (North J). 
108  BP [2014] FCA 715, [59] (North J). 
109  See Akiba (2013) 250 CLR 209, 237 [52] (Hayne, Kiefel and Bell JJ). 





IV RECOGNISING ANCESTRAL WATER RIGHTS IN CHILE 
 
Article 64 of the Indigenous Law has been used by the Chilean courts to recognise the 
ancestral water rights of ‘indigenous communities’111 in northern Chile in a way similar 
to native title rights to water in Australia.112 Article 64 provides: 
 
The waters of the Aimara and Atacameña communities must be especially protected. 
Waters, including rivers, canals, streams and springs, found on the lands of the 
Indigenous communities established by this law will be considered property of 
ownership and use of the Indigenous communities, without prejudice to the rights that 
other right holders have registered in accordance with the Water Code. 
 
New water rights must not be granted over lakes, ponds, springs, rivers and other 
aquifers that supply waters owned by the various Indigenous communities established 
by this law without first guaranteeing normal water supply to the affected communities. 
 
Despite the fact that the word ‘recognise’ is not used in article 64, the Chilean courts 
have treated article 64 as a recognition mechanism much like the Australian native title 
model.113 A key difference is that ancestral water rights under article 64 are much 
stronger than rights to water as recognised in Australian native title law, which cannot 
amount to rights of ownership, and do not convey the right to exclude. Conversely, 
article 64 establishes ‘a presumption of ownership and use’,114 recognising a right of 
‘propiedad’, which at Chilean civil law entails a ‘derecho real’ (similar to the Latin in 
rem)115 in a physical thing, to enjoy and dispose of it arbitrarily, provided it is not 
against the law or the rights of others.116 The right of propiedad in water is protected by 
article 19(24) of the Constitution 1980 (Chile).117 Significantly, the Chilean Courts have 
 
111  Indigenous communities are constituted in accordance with arts 9 and 10 of the Indigenous Law. 
According to the National Indigenous Development Corporation’s website, as at 26 May 2017 
there were 3213 registered communities with 125 033 members and 1843 registered associations 
with 69 660 members listed in the Register of Indigenous Communities and Associations: 
Corporación Nacional de Desarrollo Indígena, Registro de Comunidades y Asociaciones 
Indígenas [Register of Indigenous Communities and Associations] 
<http://www.conadi.gob.cl/index.php/registro-de-comunidades-y-asociaciones-indigenas>.  
112  Article 64 refers only to the water rights of the Aymara and Atacameña indigenous 
communities. However, a number of indigenous communities have relied on international law to 
recognise their water rights despite not belonging to those ethnicities: Interview with Juan 
Carlos Araya (Santiago, 15 November 2011); David Espinoza Quezada, ‘Regularizaciones 
Remitidas por DGA Región de Antofagasta a Tribunales Competentes’ [Regularisations 
Remitted by the DGA in the Region of Antofagasta to Competent Courts] (Water Rights 
Database, Dirección General de Aguas [General Water Directorate], last updated January 2012) 
(copy on file with author). 
113  Alejandro Papic Domínguez con Comunidad Indígena Aymara Chusmiza y Usmagama 
(‘Chusmiza’), Corte Suprema de Chile [Supreme Court of Chile], No 2840-2008 (25 November 
2009) [8]. 
114  Ibid [7]. 
115  See generally Samantha Hepburn, Principles of Property Law (Cavendish Publishing, 1998) 2, 
‘[t]he definitive right in private property relationships is the right of the owner to the use, 
possession and enjoyment of the object to the exclusion of the rest of the world. Legally, this 
right is known as an “in rem” right because it is enforceable against the rest of the world’. 
116  Civil Code 1855 (Chile) art 582. 
117  Constitución Política de la República de Chile 1980 [Political Constitution of the Republic of 





not found the public vesting of water to be an obstacle to allocating private rights of 
propiedad in water,118 by understanding that propiedad attaches to the right to use the 
water and not to the water itself.119 
 
As in Australia, the courts are responsible for determining when, and on what terms, 
indigenous landholders will have their water rights recognised under article 64.   In fact, 
water rights provided for in article 64 do not need a registered title (a derecho de 
aprovechamiento) in order to be protected.120 An indigenous community could, for 
example, rely on article 64 to enforce its water rights against prejudicial state action 
using administrative law writs such as the recurso de protección (action for protection 
of constitutional rights).121 However, by convention, ancestral water rights recognised 
in article 64 have been provided for in the judicial process of ‘regularisation’ under 
transitory article 2 of the Water Code, discussed above.122 
 
It is important to note that the regularisation process predates the Indigenous Law, and 
was designed with informal water use by agricultural, rather than indigenous, water 
users in mind. The process was devised to formalise the vast numbers of registered and 
unregistered water rights existing under different laws at the time of passing the Water 
Code,123 considered necessary in order for water markets to emerge. Regularisation 
adopted the logic of ‘prescription’ from Chilean civil law, which is based on the idea 
that the possessor of a thing, or a right in a thing, for a determined period of time without 
title or ownership, can acquire a right of ownership on the general understanding that 
the prior owner or title holder has lost possession and done nothing to recuperate it.124 
The basis for prescription, and therefore regularisation, is ‘longstanding possession’.125  
 
In order to regularise an unregistered water right an applicant must prove uninterrupted 
water use since 1976 (five years before the commencement of the Water Code),126 
adopting the standard for prescription of real estate in Chile’s Civil Code 1855 
(Chile).127 Secondly, the use must have been conducted ‘without force or secrecy’, and 
‘without recognising the rights of others’,128 requirements similar to those to establish 
adverse possession at common law enabled to varying extents in the legislation of 
Australian states: ‘physical control that is open rather than secret, peaceful rather than 
 
118  Civil Code 1855 (Chile) art 595; Water Code art 5. 
119  Chusmiza, Corte Suprema de Chile [Supreme Court of Chile], No 2840-2008 (25 November 
2009) [4]. 
120  Vergara Blanco, above n 51, 327. 
121  Constitution 1980 (Chile) art 20.  
122  This convention was established pursuant to Indigenous Law transitory art 3 item 2. See 
Chusmiza, Corte Suprema de Chile [Supreme Court of Chile], No 2840-2008 (25 November 
2009) [8]. 
123  See Vergara Blanco, above n 51, 327–33; Dinko Tomislav Rendic Véliz, Derechos de Agua y 
Pueblos Indígenas: Especial Referencia a los Derechos Ancestrales de la Comunidad Indígena 
de Toconce [Water Rights and Indigenous Peoples: Special Reference to the Ancenstral Rights 
of the Indigenous Community of Toconce] (Librotecnia, 2009) 148–9. 
124  Civil Code 1855 (Chile) art 2492. 
125  Vergara Blanco, above n 51, 347–9. 
126  Water Code transitory art 2. 
127  Civil Code 1855 (Chile) art 2508. 





forceful, and without the actual consent of the true owner’.129 The courts have applied 
the process of regularisation in conjunction with article 7 of Decree Law 2.603 1979 
(Chile), which deemed the person making ‘uso efectivo’, or ‘productive use’, of a water 
right to be its owner.130 
 
The regularisation process in transitory article 2 has also been used by other indigenous 
communities in Chile to recognise customary water use and obtain a derecho de 
aprovechamiento without recourse to article 64,131 sometimes relying on protections in 
the International Labour Organisation’s Convention Concerning Indigenous and Tribal 
Peoples in Independent Countries (‘Convention 169’).132 However, my focus here is on 
the recognition of ancestral water rights pursuant to article 64 as, reminiscent of native 
title, problems of continuity and priority have undermined the potential for the 
regularising courts to recognise such rights in Chile. 
 
A The Problem of Continuity 
 
Because article 64 seeks to recognise ancestral rights,133 which find their origin in pre-
Columbian water practices, it has similar shortcomings to those of the native title 
recognition model in Australia. The Chilean courts have construed rights under article 
64 as ancestral, relying on their description as such under another provision of the 
Indigenous Law,134 although the Indigenous Law provides no definition for ancestral. 
According to the Spanish Language Dictionary, the Spanish word ‘ancestral’ can refer 
to both ‘belonging and relative to ancestors’ or ‘traditional and of remote origin’.135 In 
fact, the word only appears twice in the Indigenous Law, its other appearance being in 
article 26, which provides that the Minister for Planning and Cooperation can establish 
areas of indigenous development in territorial spaces where indigenous ethnicities have 
lived ‘ancestralmente’ (‘ancestrally’). 
 
 
129  Hepburn, Principles of Property Law, above n 115, 64, referring to the test from Mulcahy v 
Curramore Pty Ltd [1974] 2 NSWLR 464, 475 (Bowen CJ in Eq). See also Riley v Penttila 
[1974] VR 547: it must also be established that the person intended to possess the land 
adversely. But Hepburn also makes a distinction between ‘adverse possession’ (a right based on 
limitation) and ‘long standing use’ (a right based on prescription): Hepburn, Principles of 
Property Law, above n 115, 64. The distinction between prescription and limitation appears not 
to apply in the same way in Chile where prescription appears to be the equivalent to adverse 
possession. See, eg, Limitation of Actions Act 1958 (Vic) ss 8, 15, 18, 20. 
130  See, eg, Comunidad Atacameña Toconce con Essan SA, Corte Suprema de Chile [Supreme 
Court of Chile], No 986-2003 (22 March 2004) 6.  
131  See Corporación Nacional de Desarollo Indígena [National Indigenous Development 
Corporation] and Dirección General de Aguas [General Water Directorate], ‘Convenio 
Dirección General de Aguas y Corporación Nacional de Desarrollo Indígena’ [Convention 
between the National Indigenous Development Corporation and General Water Directorate] 
(Chile, Interdepartmental Convention, 2000) (copy on file with author). 
132  Convention Concerning Indigenous and Tribal Peoples in Independent Countries, signed 27 
June 1989, 28 ILM 1382 (entered into force 5 September 1991). 
133  Chusmiza, Corte Suprema de Chile [Supreme Court of Chile], No 2840-2008 (25 November 
2009) [8]; Comunidad Atacameña Toconce con Essan SA, Corte Suprema de Chile [Supreme 
Court of Chile], No 986-2003 (22 March 2004) [7]. 
134  Indigenous Law transitory art 3 item 2. 
135 Real Academia Española, Ancestral (2017) Diccionario de la Lengua Española [Spanish 





Some courts and commentators have alluded to theories of legal pluralism and argued 
that the recognition of indigenous water rights in article 64 represents recognition of 
indigenous law-making systems,136 however, the rights more accurately arise out of 
their ‘historical possession’. The courts describe ancestral water rights as having their 
origins in ‘time immemorial’,137 reflecting terminology from early United States 
indigenous land rights jurisprudence.138 In contrast to Australian native title, which 
finds its origins in the ‘traditional laws and customs’ of the native title group, ancestral 
water rights arise out of the historical use of the resources by indigenous groups,139 in 
an approach reminiscent of United States140 and Canadian jurisprudence.141 This 
‘historical use’ approach is consistent with the Chilean approach to indigenous title 
more generally as being based in ‘immemorial occupation and use’.142 It also accords 
with the framing of ancestral rights to land and resources in inter-American 
jurisprudence, as rooted in ‘historical possession’.143 The historical use is a ‘customary’ 
use, because it does not derive from a registered title or acto de autoridad 
(administrative act).144  
 
Ancestral water rights may be recognised under article 64 where indigenous-specific 
landholders can show that they have used specific water resources since pre-sovereignty 
times. The National Indigenous Development Corporation routinely commissions 
evidence on behalf of indigenous communities to accredit ancestral use, since time 
immemorial, and the court commonly refers to evidence of the antiquity of water 
 
136  Corporación Movimiento Unitario Campesino y Etnias de Chile con Dirección General de 
Aguas, Corte Suprema de Chile [Supreme Court of Chile], No 7899-2013 (5 May 2014) [9]. 
Interview with Nancy Yáñez (Santiago, 22 November 2011); Interview with María Angélica 
Alegría (Santiago, 17 November 2011).  
137  Chusmiza, Corte Suprema de Chile [Supreme Court of Chile], No 2840-2008 (25 November 
2009) [5], [8]; Comunidad Atacameña Toconce con Essan SA, Corte Suprema de Chile 
[Supreme Court of Chile], No 986-2003 (22 March 2004) [2]–[3].  
138  See, eg, Coos Bay, Lower Umpqua and Siuslaw Indian Tribes v United States, 87 Ct Cl 143 
(1938). See generally Young, above n 72, 86 [4.2.1]; Mabo [No 2] (1992) 175 CLR 1, 189 
(Toohey J); Milirrpum v Nabalco Pty Ltd [1971] 17 FLR 141, 152 (Blackburn J). 
139  Chusmiza, Corte Suprema de Chile [Supreme Court of Chile], No 2840-2008 (25 November 
2009) [5], [8]; Comunidad Atacameña Toconce con Essan SA, Corte Suprema de Chile 
[Supreme Court of Chile], No 986-2003 (22 March 2004) [2]–[3].  
140  The approach taken in the United States jurisprudence is that the source of ‘Indian title’ is the 
indigenous group’s exclusive use and occupation of land over a long period of time. See, eg, 
United States v Santa Fe Public Railroad Company, 314 US 339 (1941).  
141  The Canadian Aboriginal title cases also emphasise occupation of land prior to the acquisition of 
sovereignty as the source of a sui generis title. Calder v Attorney-General of British Colombia 
[1973] SCR 313, 368–9, 372–5 (Hall J); Delgamuukw v British Colombia [1997] 3 SCR 1010, 
1082 [114] (Lamer CJ, Cory and Major JJ); Tsilhqot’in Nation v British Colombia [2014] 2 SCR 
257, 273 [14] (Vickers J). 
142  Gonzalo Aguilar Cavallo, ‘El Título Indígena y su Aplicabilidad en el Derecho Chileno’ 
[Indigenous Title and its Application in Chilean Law] (2005) Revista Ius Et Paxis 11(1) 269, 
271–2. 
143  See, eg, Mayagna (Sumo) Awas Tingni Community v Nicaragua, Merits, Reparations and Costs, 
Judgment, Inter-Am Ct HR (ser C) No 79, [87(b)] (31 August 2001); Saramaka People v 
Suriname, Preliminary Objections, Merits, Reparations and Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am Ct HR 
(ser C) No 172, [96] (28 November 2007). 





infrastructure and agricultural land (terraces).145 For example, in Comunidad 
Atacameña Toconce con Essan SA the Supreme Court accepted: 
 
with the testimony of the applicant it has been accredited that since time immemorial the 
inhabitants of Toconce have made an uninterrupted use of the waters from the river for 
human and animal consumption and for irrigation, as owners and in sight of the whole 
world, with the consequence that this is taken as established the use of the waters in the 
terms indicated. This was corroborated in addition during the site inspection made by the 
tribunal.146 
 
The expectation that ancestral water rights will be established by evidence of historical 
use, since time immemorial, is reinforced in the process of regularisation, which 
requires an applicant for regularisation to prove uninterrupted (productive) water use 
since five years prior to the commencement of the Water Code (ie, 1976). This proof is 
usually provided in a technical report prepared by the General Water Directorate, based 
on an inspection of construction and maintenance of physical water infrastructure such 
as canals and wells.147 As an example, the Court in Asociación Atacameña de Regantes 
y Agricultores Aguas Blancas accepted evidence from the General Water Directorate’s 
technical report in satisfaction of the requirement for uninterrupted use: 
 
It must be kept in mind, that the report referred to highlights that it was satisfied that the 
antiquity of the stone works found in the majority of water sources, as well as the rustic 
irrigation works (terraces), accredit an immemorial use of the resource.148 
 
Continuity problems also affect the Chilean ancestral rights recognition model. Many 
indigenous groups in Chile are unable to prove that they have made uninterrupted 
historical use of particular water resources as, due to widespread dispossession of 
indigenous territories, in many situations indigenous groups have not continued to use 
water resources since pre-sovereignty times.149 Others do not have the finance needed 
to construct or maintain water infrastructure.150 There is also uncertainty as to whether 
ancestral water rights can adapt or evolve over time. My study of regularisation cases 
in the second region of Antofagasta revealed a combination of irrigated agriculture and 
grazing as the main purposes for which indigenous applicants sought water rights in 
 
145  See, eg, Comunidad Atacameña Toconce con Essan SA, Corte Suprema de Chile [Supreme 
Court of Chile], No 986-2003 (22 March 2004) [2]; Alejandro Papic con Comunidad Indígena 
Aymara Chuzmira y Usmagama, Corte de Apelaciones de Iquique [Iquique Court of Appeal] 
(Chile), No 817-2006 (9 April 2008) [10] (second instance decision).  
146  Comunidad Atacameña Toconce con Essan SA, Corte Suprema de Chile [Supreme Court of 
Chile], No 986-2003 (22 March 2004) [2]. 
147  Interview with Carlos Herrera Inzunza (Temuco, 11 November 2011). Herrera was a water 
lawyer working for the National Indigenous Development Corporation at the time of interview. 
148  Inscripción Sentencia Derechos de Aprovechamiento de Aguas Asociación Atacameña de 
Regantes y Agricultores de Aguas Blancas (Unreported, Segundo Juzgado Civil de Calama, 
Chile [Second Civil Court of Calama, Chile], Nr-Ii-1381, 19 November 1997) [2]. 
149  See Nancy Yáñez and Raúl Molina (eds), Las Aguas Indígenas en Chile [Indigenous Waters in 
Chile] (LOM Ediciones, 2011) 60, 105–6. 
150  Interview with Carlos Herrera Inzunza (Temuco, 11 November 2011). But see Interview with 
Juan Carlos Araya (Santiago, 15 November 2011). Araya, a lawyer for the National Indigenous 
Development Corporation, argues that it is not necessary for a community to have canals to 
show use and has in some cases managed to regularise rights without productive use, but admits 





reliance on article 64,151 although some cases also included sustaining wetlands.152 The 
use of water for agriculture and grazing would probably come within the use of water 
for commercial purposes as envisaged in this article, however, there is still an 
expectation by Chilean courts, and government officials, that indigenous water use will 
be consistent with ancestral, or pre-sovereignty, practices. Cuadra explains, ‘not just 
any use of water enjoys legal recognition, rather only those that satisfy certain 
conditions’ to which he adds that it must be an ‘antique use’ of the water resource,153 
carried out continuously since pre-Columbian times, which, as we have seen above, 
may be evidenced by antique water infrastructure. 
 
The requirement to prove productive use in the process of regularisation also means 
that ancestral water rights have typically been recognised in reliance on article 64 for 
the consumptive use of surface waters only.154 It would be difficult for an applicant for 
regularisation to prove productive use that is non-consumptive or subterranean in the 
absence of water infrastructure. This is despite the fact that clause 5 of an 
interdepartmental agreement between the National Indigenous Development 
Corporation and the General Water Directorate on the regularisation process provides 
that non-consumptive and subterranean water rights are also contemplated within the 
concept of ancestral rights.155  
 
Thus, the problem of continuity limits the potential to recognise ancestral water rights 
under article 64 of the Indigenous Law in a similar way as seen with native title rights 
to water in Australia. Only those groups who have continued to maintain their water 
rights since pre-sovereignty times have had water rights recognised, and regularised, in 
reliance on article 64.156 Yet, by the late 20th century other right holders held almost all 
derechos de aprovechamiento in Chile.157 Some have observed that article 64 adds little 
 
151  See, eg, Inscripción Sentencia Derechos de Aprovechamiento de Aguas Asociación Atacameña 
de Regantes y Agricultores de Aguas Blancas (Unreported, Segundo Juzgado Civil de Calama, 
Chile [Second Civil Court of Calama, Chile], Nr-Ii-1381, 19 November 1997); Inscripción 
Sentencia Derechos de Aprovechamiento de Aguas Asociación Atacameña de Regantes y 
Agricultores del Rio Vilama (Unreported, Segundo Juzgado Civil de Calama, Chile [Second 
Civil Court of Calama, Chile], Nr-Ii-1391, 25 November 1997). 
152  See, eg, Inscripción Sentencia Derechos de Aprovechamiento de Aguas Comunidad Atacameña 
de Peine (Unreported, Segundo Juzgado Civil de Calama, Chile [Second Civil Court of Calama, 
Chile], Nr-Ii-1383, 19 November 1997); Inscripción Sentencia Derechos de Aprovechamiento 
de Aguas Comunidad Atacameña de Cupo (Unreported, Segundo Juzgado Civil de Calama, 
Chile [Second Civil Court of Calama, Chile], Nr-Ii-1387, 19 November 1997). 
153  Manuel Cuadra, ‘Teoría y Práctica de los Derechos Ancestrales de Agua de las Comunidades 
Atacameñas’ [Practical Theory of the Ancestral Water Rights of the Atacameña Communties] 
(2000) 19 Estudios Atacameños 93, 101–2. 
154  Espinoza Quezada, above n 112. 
155  Corporación Nacional de Desarrollo Indígena [National Indigenous Development Corporation] 
and Dirección General de Aguas [General Water Directorate] ‘Convenio Marco para la 
Protección, Constitución y Reestablecimiento de los Derechos de Agua de Propiedad Ancestral 
de las Comunidades Aymaras y Atacameñas’ [Convention for the Protection, Constitution and 
Reestablishment of the Ancestral Water Property Rights of the Aymara and Atacameña 
Communities] (Interdepartmental Convention, 1997) (Chile) (copy on file with author) Part II 
[5]. 
156  See Yáñez and Molina, above n 149, 106.  
157  Jessica Budds, ‘Power, Nature and Neoliberalism: The Political Ecology of Water in Chile’ 





to the procedures already available to regularise historical water use in the transitory 
provisions of the Water Code.158  
 
B The Problem of Priority 
 
Another similarity between recognition models in both countries is that the Chilean 
model excludes situations where ancestral water rights would conflict with water use 
rights held by third parties. In contrast to the future acts regime under the Native Title 
Act, which prioritises the future granting of water rights to third parties, Chilean law, at 
least, provides for ancestral water rights to take priority as against the water use rights 
sought by third parties in the future.159 This means that, since the passage of the 
Indigenous Law, third parties must not be allocated new derechos de aprovechamiento 
if this would prevent normal water supply to the indigenous communities.160 Whether 
‘normal water supply’ would be prevented is considered in a technical report from the 
National Indigenous Development Corporation evaluating the impact on indigenous 
communities of all new water rights applications in indigenous areas of Chile’s first 
and second regions.161 The Corporation contracts lawyers, anthropologists and 
geographers to check whether a community will be affected by a new application and 
if necessary recommends that the application is refused.162 However, on the question of 
what is meant by ‘normal water supply’ there is little guidance, being a case-by-case 
assessment made by the Corporation when preparing its report. Of course, because 
rights to use surface water resources in Chile’s north were already largely allocated to 
third parties at the commencement of the Indigenous Law, the protection of ancestral 
water rights from the future granting of other derechos de aprovechamiento is of less 
consequence as might first appear.  
 
As regards the derechos de aprovechamiento already held by third parties, article 64 
item 1 prioritises those rights ahead of ancestral water rights, by providing that 
ancestral water rights can only be recognised ‘without prejudice to the rights that third 
parties have registered in accordance with the Water Code’.163 Again, because most 
water rights were already held by third parties, recognising indigenous water rights 
would prejudice third parties, and be incapable of recognition, in many situations. 
 
158  See Interview with Manuel Cuadra (Antofagasta, 23 November 2011). 
159  Indigenous Law art 64 item 2. 
160  See Codelco Chile División Chuquicamata con Dirección General de Aguas (Unreported, Corte 
de Apelaciones de Antofagasta, Chile [Court of Appeal of Antofagasta, Chile], No 14003-2013, 
15 May 2014), in which the Court of Appeal upheld a decision of the General Water Directorate 
refusing an application for an authorisation to explore and extract subterranean waters on fiscal 
lands on the basis that this would cause prejudice to the indigenous occupiers of the land, whose 
water rights were protected under article 64. 
161  Corporación Nacional de Desarrollo Indígena [National Indigenous Development Corporation] 
and Dirección General de Aguas [General Water Directorate] ‘Convenio Marco para la 
Protección, Constitución y Reestablecimiento de los Derechos de Agua de Propiedad Ancestral 
de las Comunidades Aymaras y Atacameñas’ [Convention for the Protection, Constitution and 
Reestablishment of the Ancestral Water Property Rights of the Aymara and Atacameña 
Communities] (Interdepartmental Convention, 1997) (Chile) (copy on file with author) Part II 
[6]. 
162  Interview with Juan Carlos Araya (Santiago, 15 November 2011). The problem, Araya explains, 
is in relation to new applications with respect to subterranean waters. As there are few studies of 
subterranean waters it is hard to anticipate the effect on surface waters. 





Notwithstanding, the courts have continued to recognise ancestral water rights in 
reliance on article 64 in Chile’s north as part of the regularisation process,164 mostly for 
minimal flows still being customarily used by indigenous communities, available 
within the water system.165 According to a former National Indigenous Development 
Corporation lawyer, the ancestral water rights regularised in reliance on article 64 are 
not always ‘viable economically’.166 
 
The problem of priority underpins the Supreme Court of Chile’s landmark 2009 
decision in Alejandro Papic Domínguez con Comunidad Indígena Aymara Chusmiza y 
Usmagama (‘Chusmiza’).167 In that case, the indigenous communities of Chusmiza and 
Usmagama claimed to have used the thermal mineral waters emanating from the 
Chusmiza spring for irrigation and human and animal consumption, distributed via an 
array of wells, canals and other infrastructure, since time immemorial.168 However, a 
water bottling company held derechos de aprovechamiento authorising the use of water 
from the mineral spring, as well as the title to the land on which it was found, 
undermining the continued use of the waters by the communities.169 Despite the fact 
that the bottling company held various derechos de aprovechamiento, which the 
company claimed would be prejudiced by the decision,170 the Court in Chusmiza 
recognised the communities’ water rights under article 64, with reference to what it saw 
as the provision’s objective. That was: the repopulation, subsistence and development 
of rural indigenous communities in Chile’s north, which depend on adequate water 
supply.171 With this objective in mind, and emboldened by International Labour 
Organisation Convention 169,172 the Supreme Court emphasised that the communities’ 
 
164  According to General Water Directorate records, in the second region of Antofagasta a total 
flow of 2729.6 litres per second of water was allocated to indigenous communities between 
1995 and 2012 in reliance on article 64: Espinoza Quezada, above n 112.  
165 Espinoza Quezada, above n 111122. 
166  Interview with Diego Sotomayor (Santiago, 23 December 2013). 
167  Chusmiza, Corte Suprema de Chile [Supreme Court of Chile], No 2840-2008 (25 November 
2009). 
168  Agua Mineral Chusmiza Saic con Comunidad Indígena Aymara Chusmiza, Juzgado de Letras de 
Pozo Almonte [Pozo Almonte Civil Court] (Chile), No 1194-1996 (31 August 2006) 11–12 
(first instance decision).  
169  Chusmiza, Corte Suprema de Chile [Supreme Court of Chile] No 2840-2008 (25 November 
2009) [1]. 
170 These registered derechos de aprovechamiento are listed in Agua Mineral Chusmiza Saic con 
Comunidad Indigena Aymara Chusmiza, Juzgado de Letras de Pozo Almonte [Pozo Almonte 
Civil Court] (Chile), No 1194-1996 (31 August 2006) 2 (first instance decision), referring to 
Decreto No 1540, 3 August 1948, Juzgado de Letras de Pozo Almonte, Resolution of 4 February 
1983, and Juzgado de Letras de Pozo Almonte, Resolution No 406 of 29 September 1983; 
Chusmiza, Corte Suprema de Chile [Supreme Court of Chile], No 2840-2008 (25 November 
2009) [3] referring to judgment No 3695-2005. The company inherited a historical water 
allocation for 10 litres per second and 10 000 litres per day granted by Supreme Decree by the 
Ministry of Public Works in 1948, which was regularised by the Civil Court under the transitory 
provisions to the Water Code in 1983. It also held a mixture of consumptive and non-
consumptive registered rights to 50 cubic metres per day and five litres per second originating in 
1996/1997 whose validity was confirmed by a separate decision of the Constitutional Division 
of the Supreme Court in 2005. 
171  Chusmiza, Corte Suprema de Chile [Supreme Court of Chile], No 2840-2008 (25 November 
2009) [7]. 
172  Convention Concerning Indigenous and Tribal Peoples in Independent Countries, signed 27 





water rights arose prior to the registered derechos de aprovechamiento held by the 
company: 
 
Of course, it is worth remembering that in this case that which is regularised is the 
ancestral right of the applicant indigenous community, whose members from time 
immemorial have made uninterrupted use of the waters for human and animal 
consumption and irrigation. It follows that the water right recognised to the Aymara 
community is therefore prior to the constitution of water use rights created in favour of 
third parties and as a corollary; it is prior to the origin of the registered rights of the 
Company.173 
 
Presumably, because the communities were already using the water there could be no 
prejudice to the third party by recognising the communities’ right.174 In fact, the Court 
reasoned, the communities’ water right already exists; it is simply being registered in 
order to provide certainty as to the amount of water being used, at what location and by 
whom.175  
 
The Chusmiza case has been described as a ‘triumph’ of indigenous water rights over 
the registered water use rights of a non-indigenous party, showing legal pluralism in 
action.176 Some have criticised the decision for causing prejudice to the holder of legally 
valid water use rights,177 and others for producing legal uncertainty around water rights 
ownership.178 The lawyer for the water bottling company has described the result in 
Chusmiza as a form of compulsory redistribution, without compensation.179 In reality, 
the Chusmiza dispute remains unresolved and illustrates the difficulty inherent in 
recognising pre-sovereignty water rights many years after the acquisition of 
sovereignty, in the presence of other rights.180 The case shows that, in situations of full 
resource allocation, it is impossible to simply recognise indigenous water rights without 
 
173  Chusmiza, Corte Suprema de Chile [Supreme Court of Chile], No 2840-2008 (25 November 
2009) [5]. 
174  According to Sotomayor, a former National Indigenous Development Corporation lawyer, the 
courts have focused on the regularisation procedure established in the Water Code, rather than 
the requirements of art 64. In the process of regularisation, provided that the applicant can prove 
it is currently using the water the courts have no option but to approve the regularisation: 
Interview with Diego Sotomayor (Santiago, 23 December 2013). 
175  Chusmiza, Corte Suprema de Chile [Supreme Court of Chile], No 2840-2008 (25 November 
2009) [4]. 
176  See Luis Carvajal and Katerina Kliwadenko, ‘Chusmiza y Usmagama, Usurpación y 
Recuperación de Aguas Ancestrales’ in Sara Larraín and Pamela Poo (eds), Conflictos por el 
Agua en Chile: Entre los Derechos Humanos y las Reglas del Mercado [Water Conflicts in 
Chile: Between Human Rights and Market Rules] (2010) 98, 105; Interview with Nancy Yáñez 
(Santiago, 22 November 2011); Yáñez and Molina, above n 149, 144–6. 
177 Interview with Gonzalo Arevalo (Santiago, 18 November 2011).  
178  Interview with Rodrigo Weisner (Santiago, 18 November 2011). Weisner, the former director of 
the General Water Directorate, argues that if the Supreme Court was inclined to recognise the 
communities’ rights to the waters from the spring it should have cancelled the company’s 
derechos de aprovechamiento so as to prevent an over-allocation, although presumably the 
Court would not have had the jurisdiction to do so as part of the cassation appeal. 
179  Interview with Gonzalo Arevalo (Santiago, 18 November 2011). 
180  Aymara Indigenous Community of Chusmiza-Usmagama and its Members v Chile, Petition 
1288-06, Inter-Am Comm’n HR, Report No 29/13 (20 March 2013). See also Interview with 





impacting on the water use rights of third parties. In such situations, some form of 
redistribution is necessary.   
 
V (RE)ALLOCATING INDIGENOUS WATER RIGHTS 
 
The Chilean Indigenous Law provided another mechanism for indigenous water rights, 
in addition to article 64. It also established an Indigenous Land and Water Fund 
(‘Fund’) to finance the allocation of land and water rights to indigenous groups.181 The 
Fund subsidises the allocation of water use rights to indigenous-specific landholders 
who would not be able to make out ancestral water rights claims because they have not 
continued to make ancestral uses of water resources, and because third parties now hold 
rights to use the resources in question. The discussion of this Fund in the following 
section invites consideration of the potential for a similar redistributive mechanism to 
be used in Australia. 
 
A Chile’s Indigenous Land and Water Fund 
 
The functions of the Fund include, pursuant to 20(c), ‘to finance the constitution, 
regularisation or purchase of water use rights or finance works destined to obtain the 
resource’. The Fund has been used in northern Chile in conjunction with article 64 to 
finance the regularisation of ancestral water rights. It has also been used to finance the 
regularisation of indigenous water rights in other parts of Chile (without article 64) 
using the process provided for in transitory article 2 of the Water Code.182 However, of 
interest here, the Fund is used to finance the constitution and purchase of derechos de 
aprovechamiento for indigenous landholders throughout Chile, often in conjunction 
with government-sponsored indigenous economic development projects.183  
 
The water use rights acquired for indigenous landholders with the assistance of the Fund 
are the same as any other derechos de aprovechamiento in Chilean water law 
frameworks. They are held independent of land title and are exercisable for any 
(including commercial) purposes. If anything, indigenous landholders in Chile have 
been dissuaded from exercising their derechos de aprovechamiento for non-commercial 
purposes by the levying of ‘fees for non-use’ on the holders of derechos de 
aprovechamiento who do not use the water for ‘productive purposes’, introduced into 
the Water Code in 2005.184 However, recent judicial and political developments suggest 
a disinclination to charge ‘fees for non-use’ to indigenous landholders.185 Like 
 
181  The main task of the Fund, set out in art 20 of the Indigenous Law is to ‘grant subsidies for the 
acquisition of lands for indigenous people or communities (or part thereof) where the surface 
area of the respective community’s lands is insufficient’. 
182  See Corporación Nacional de Desarollo Indígena [National Indigenous Development 
Corporation] and Dirección General de Aguas [General Water Directorate], ‘Convenio 
Dirección General de Aguas y Corporación Nacional de Desarollo Indígena’ [Convention 
between the National Indigenous Development Corporation and General Water Directorate] 
(Interdepartmental Convention, 2000) (Chile) (on file with the author). See also Interview with 
Nancy Yáñez (Santiago, 22 November 2011). 
183  Interview with Diego Sotomayor (Santiago, 23 December 2013). 
184  Water Code art 129 bis 4.  
185  See Corporación Movimiento Unitario Campesino y Etnias de Chile con Dirección General de 






ancestral water rights, the derechos de aprovechamiento acquired are constitutionally 
protected rights of propiedad, roughly equivalent to a right of full ownership, or the 
estate of fee simple in the common law sense. The fact that the rights may be exclusive 
aids their application to commercial purposes, where water is taken from its flow and 
consumed in its totality. 
 
The only way in which derechos de aprovechamiento acquired with the support of the 
Fund are different to the water use rights held by third parties, is that they are generally 
inalienable for 25 years applying a protection in article 22 item 1 of the Indigenous 
Law. This means that derechos de aprovechamiento acquired via the Fund typically 
remain outside of water markets for this period, unless administrative approval is 
obtained or the funds are repaid.186 The rights can still, however, be transferred within 
and between indigenous communities of the same ethnicity. 
 
The National Indigenous Development Corporation administers the Fund, receiving 
derechos de aprovechamiento from the state or private holders for allocation to 
indigenous communities.187 Where rights to use particular water resources are not 
already fully allocated to third parties, derechos de aprovechamiento can simply be 
constituted or regularised in the name of indigenous communities and the Fund pays 
for the processes.188 Derechos de aprovechamiento purchased for indigenous 
communities with assistance from the Fund are bought in the open market, and their 
title is transferred at the local Real Estate Office.189 Regulations set out the factors the 
National Indigenous Development Corporation must consider before granting subsidies 
for water rights acquisition: the number of persons or size of the community, the 
deterioration or degradation of lands affected by a lack of water, the sanitary conditions 
of families located on the property affected by a lack of water, and agricultural benefits 
from irrigation for the lands affected.190  
 
 
found that fees for non-use could not be levied against indigenous communities holding 
derechos de aprovechamiento acquired with finance from the Indigenous Land and Water Fund 
because to do so would contravene the restriction on alienation of such rights under s 22 of the 
Indigenous Law. See also Reforma el Código de Aguas, Examinando del Pago de Patente a 
Pequeños Productores Agrícolas y Campesinos, a Comunidades Agrícolas y a Indígenas y 
Comunidades Indígenas que se Señalan 2012 [Reform of the Water Code, Examining the 
Payment of Tax by Small Agricultural Producers, to Agricultural and Indigenous Communities 
Included] (Boletin No 8315-01) (Chile), which proposes to exempt indigenous people and 
communities under the indigenous law from fees for non-use. 
186  Indigenous Law art 22 item 2.  
187  Indigenous Law art 21. Regulations provide that the finance is a subsidy used to acquire water 
use rights, which indigenous communities or individuals can apply for in accordance with a 
number of conditions: Decreto 395 Que Aprueba el Reglamento sobre el Fondo de Tierras y 
Aguas Indígenas 1994 [Decree 395 Approving the Indigenous Land and Water Fund 
Regulations 1994] (Chile). 
188  In order to ‘constitute’ new water rights, indigenous communities must apply to the General 
Water Directorate for new water rights in accordance with the process set out in Water Code art 
140. The application must specify the name of the applicant at the water resource concerned, the 
quantity of water sought and its point of capture, the mode of extraction and type of right sought 
(i.e. whether consumptive or non-consumptive, permanent or eventual, continuous or 
discontinuous). 
189  Water Code arts 112–13.  
190  Decreto 395 Que Aprueba el Reglamento sobre el Fondo de Tierras y Aguas Indígenas 1994 





The allocation of water use rights to indigenous landholders with the support of the 
Fund is not limited by the problem of continuity in the same way as the recognition of 
ancestral rights pursuant to article 64. There is no express requirement in the 
Regulations to prove prior water use in order to access the Fund. It can, therefore, be 
used to finance acquisition of water use rights in situations where the indigenous 
community has no historical relationship with the particular water, or had its use 
interrupted at some point since sovereignty. However, reflecting the Government’s 
intention that the Fund be used to support the economic development of indigenous 
lands, the National Indigenous Development Corporation assumes that water rights 
purchases will be financed for the general productive benefit of land, and there is an 
assumption that derechos de aprovechamiento will be provided for irrigation.191  
 
The Fund was intended as a ‘creative mechanism’ to deal with the problem of priority 
by financing water rights acquisitions from third parties for allocation to indigenous-
specific landholders.192 This redistribution is made possible by the unbundled status of 
derechos de aprovechamiento, and their availability for purchase in water markets, 
which means that water use rights may even be provided to indigenous landholders in 
situations where rights to use water resources are already fully allocated to third parties. 
Other right holders are not adversely impacted, as they are willing sellers and receive 
market price. The Fund does not necessarily allow indigenous communities in Chile to 
recoup their particular ancestral lands and waters, however, there is no doubt that it is 
an important supplement to the recognition of ancestral water rights in article 64. It 
responds to the reality that indigenous groups have, in most cases, been dispossessed 
their ancestral interests, and rights to use water resources historically used by 
indigenous landholders are now held by others. Instead of focusing on historical rights 
it responds to ongoing indigenous disadvantage in the distribution of water use rights.  
 
Because water resources in many parts of Chile were approaching full allocation by the 
time the Indigenous Law was passed, with no share of derechos de aprovechamiento 
having previously been set aside for allocation to indigenous groups, purchases would 
be instrumental. However, the Chilean Government has been criticised for providing 
the Fund with inadequate finance.193 Accordingly, the Chilean experience illustrates the 
importance of setting aside a share of water resources for future allocation to 
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indigenous-specific landholders prior to water resources reaching full allocation in 
order to reduce the cost of buying back water use rights from third parties in the future.  
 
B The Potential for an ‘Indigenous Water Holder’ in Australia 
 
Native title rights to water have the important function of recognising the traditional 
and cultural rights of native titleholders in water, and should continue to be 
accommodated as ‘environmental and public benefit’ outcomes. This may be achieved, 
for example, through planning for instream ‘cultural flows’, which may not require a 
water use right. However, there is little potential for native title rights to water to be 
recognised in the future for purposes like irrigation or industry. The problems with the 
native title recognition model are path dependent, because the focus of native title is the 
historical rights of indigenous groups, pursuant to traditional laws and customs that 
have been observed and acknowledged, in a substantially uninterrupted manner, since 
pre-sovereignty times. The idea of recognising pre-existing rights produces inevitable 
tensions around the continuity of indigenous rights since pre-sovereignty times and 
priority vis-a-vis other interests, because of the passage of time since the acquisition of 
sovereignty. The impact of both of these problems is to reduce the scope for commercial 
water rights. 
 
1 Beyond Recognition: Supplementing the Native Title Recognition Model 
 
Could the Native Title Act be amended to expand the application of native title rights to 
water to commercial purposes? The Australian Law Reform Commission has recently 
proposed a number of amendments to Native Title Act to better accommodate 
‘commercial rights’, although it made no specific recommendation with respect to 
water.194 Even if these reforms are implemented in the future, native title law and 
legislation, as a recognition mechanism, cannot do away entirely with the problem of 
continuity. Native title recognises ‘prior rights and interests’195 pursuant to traditional 
laws and customs that were not recognised at the acquisition of sovereignty, meaning 
that the native title applicant must prove that its rights enjoy continuity with pre-
sovereignty interests.196 This is both difficult in practice and directs recognition to pre-
sovereignty resource use. Moreover, third parties have often acquired rights to the same 
resources since the acquisition of sovereignty, which limits further the potential for 
recognition or the exercise of any rights that are capable of recognition. 
 
The ‘traditional law and custom’ approach to proving native title rights in Australia is 
often held responsible for Australia’s particular predicament with ‘continuity’.197 Some, 
like Pearson, have suggested that the problem of continuity could be ameliorated if 
native title rights were characterised as arising not out of traditional laws and customs 
 
194  Australian Law Reform Commission, above n 74, 249. 
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but out of historical possession and use,198 relying on the judgment of Toohey J in Mabo 
[No 2]199 and American and Canadian approaches to establishing native title,200 which 
better accommodate the evolution or change of native title rights and interests over time. 
Toohey J’s reasoning provided that because such a ‘possessory title’ is sourced in the 
common law, it arises upon the acquisition of sovereignty and there is no need to prove 
any pre-sovereignty laws and customs, merely occupation at the time of sovereignty.201 
Indigenous occupation at sovereignty is recognised by the common law, becoming a 
fee simple title, even if the indigenous inhabitants have since lost possession.202   
 
Indigenous rights to land and resources in Chile can be best characterised as arising out 
of ‘historical possession’ or use, consistent with Inter-American jurisprudence.203  
Nonetheless, the problem of continuity has limited the potential to recognise ancestral 
water rights in Chile, in much the same way as has occurred with respect to native title 
rights to water in Australia. Historical possession and use of land and resources may be 
easier to prove than the content of pre-sovereignty laws and customs authorising 
resource use, but recognition mechanisms based on historical possession cannot avoid 
the problem of continuity altogether. All recognition mechanisms are an attempt to 
recognise historical rights and raise inevitable tensions around continuity of connection 
because of the period of time that has elapsed since colonisation.204  
 
Even if the Native Title Act were amended to deem certain cases as satisfying the 
continuity requirement, as the Australian Law Reform Commission has suggested, 
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General of British Colombia [1973] SCR 313, 368–9, 372–5; Delgamuukw v British Colombia 
[1997] 3 SCR 1010, 1082 [114]; Tsilhqot’in Nation v British Colombia [2014] 2 SCR 257, 273 
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recognition of native title rights to water would still in many cases be impacted by the 
inconsistent grant of other water use rights under state water legislation.205 A similar 
problem of priority undermines the potential to recognise ancestral water rights under 
article 64 of the Indigenous Law, leaving little scope for recognition. As discussed 
above, in recent jurisprudence, the courts have attempted to recognise ancestral water 
rights despite the presence of other users, in an effort to support the repopulation of 
indigenous territories where indigenous-specific landholders have been dispossessed of 
their water rights. However, the cases show that in the case of fully allocated water 
resources, a recognition mechanism cannot provide for indigenous water rights without 
some form of redistribution. 
 
Another reason for looking outside the native title recognition model is practical.  
Native title is a long, difficult, expensive, and ad hoc approach to resolving indigenous 
claims to land and resources.206 Even if the native title recognition model for indigenous 
water rights were to evolve to encompass commercial rights, as some commentators 
predict, it could take years or even decades for indigenous people to benefit from 
recognition. The need to address indigenous disadvantage, however, is immediate. The 
First Peoples’ Water Engagement Council has urged: 
 
Delaying the elevation of indigenous rights to water for economic development on the 
water reform agenda will impede the effectiveness of water as a tool for improving the 
personal and economic wellbeing of Indigenous Australians.207 
 
The adoption of market mechanisms for the regulation of water resources in Australia 
adds further urgency to demands for indigenous water rights, by making it easier for 
third parties to acquire the right to use water on or affecting indigenous lands. 
Competitive water markets are designed to grow to encompass more traders and more 
water use rights, meaning that there will be less water available for responding to 
indigenous water demands in the future.208 
 
Native title was never intended to be a comprehensive solution for indigenous land and 
resource rights in Australia. The Native Title Act was intended to be part of a social 
justice package aimed at indigenous social and economic development. As the then 
Prime Minister Keating observed: 
 
The government has always recognised that despite its historic significance, the Mabo 
decision gives little more than a sense of justice to those Aboriginal communities whose 
native title has been extinguished or lost without consultation, negotiation or 
 
205  Native Title Act ss 24JA, 24KA, 24HA(4)–(5), (7), 238. 
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Australia’s Water Law and Policy Fulfil Indigenous Aspirations?’ (2013) 30(2) Environmental 
and Planning Law Journal 132, 137. 
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Policy Group, ‘A Policy Statement on North Australian Indigenous Water Rights’ (Policy 
Statement, November 2009) <http://www.nailsma.org.au>. The Alliance has framed its water 
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compensation. Their dispossession has been total, their loss has been complete. The 
government shares the view of ATSIC, Aboriginal organisations and the Council for 
Aboriginal Reconciliation, that justice, equality and fairness demand that the social and 




If Australian governments are to completely respond to the ongoing exclusion of 
indigenous Australians’ experience from water law frameworks, it does not make sense 
to continue to rely on native title alone: an ad hoc and partial response to indigenous 
land and resource rights in Australia. Besides other reasons, to restrain indigenous water 
rights in this way would disregard the vast amounts of indigenous land held outside of 
native title under indigenous land rights legislation, including almost half of the 
Northern Territory held under the Aboriginal Land Rights (Northern Territory Act) 
1976 (Cth).210 
 
Could legislation not be used in Australia to establish a mechanism that allocates 
commercial water use rights to indigenous landholders, as done in Chile? There are 
already a few discrete examples where legislation has been used in Australia to allocate 
commercial water rights to indigenous groups, outside of the native title process. For 
example, Aboriginal ‘access licences’ may be allocated under the Water Management 
Act 2000 (NSW), some of which are exercisable for commercial purposes. 
Unfortunately, Aboriginal access licences have enjoyed little take-up in New South 
Wales,211 perhaps because the licences only authorise the use of small quantities of 
water, and are only available in well-watered coastal areas and not the over-allocated 
Murray Darling Basin. In Queensland and the Northern Territory, there are examples 
of indigenous reserves being included in water plans to set aside a share of the 
consumptive pool of water to support indigenous ‘economic … aspirations’,212 although 
Australian governments have distanced themselves from the indigenous water reserve 
policies in recent years.213  
 
Despite their limitations, the existence of each of these allocation mechanisms 
transcends the assumption in Australian law and related debates that indigenous water 
rights are (or should be) restricted to non-commercial purposes. However, indigenous 
exclusion from water law frameworks is an all-encompassing problem in Australia, 
which deserves a comprehensive solution. It would not be the first time that a statutory 
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allocation model was used in Australia because of the limitations of the native title 
process. The Aboriginal Land Rights (Northern Territory) Act 1976 (Cth), for example, 
was a political response to the failure of the court to recognise native title in Milirrpum 
v Nabalco Pty Ltd.214  
 
2 An Indigenous Water Access Entitlement  
 
Indigenous landholders, with rights to land either under native title or land rights 
legislation, could be accorded a statutory entitlement to take and use water on their 
lands for purposes extending to commercial use, as distinct from the existing traditional 
and cultural water rights held by native titleholders. A legislative entitlement would 
enjoy some protection from arbitrary change, noting that indigenous water rights 
policies have in the past been vulnerable to political uncertainty. Such an entitlement 
could be included in the Native Title Act, taking precedent from the statutory native title 
rights to water under section 211 of the Native Title Act. However, given that a native 
titleholder cannot rely on the protection of statutory water use rights under section 211 
for anything more than that which is recognised as part of a native title determination 
under section 223, providing for commercial indigenous water rights outside of the 
Native Title Act would minimise the risk of the rights being read down by association. 
The rights could be provided for in water legislation, like Aboriginal ‘access licences’ 
in New South Wales,215 or in a standalone indigenous water rights statute. 
 
What should be the nature and incidents of a commercial indigenous water right, if it is 
to be prescribed by legislation? In the legal pluralism literature, state laws that provide 
for indigenous rights are sometimes accused of translating and transforming indigenous 
interests and failing to account for the continually changing state of indigenous law.216 
Accordingly, preference should be given to mechanisms that allocate a ‘broad interest’ 
to indigenous-specific landholders, but avoid overly prescribing the content of the right 
or its conditions.217 This could be done by providing a legislative indigenous water 
access entitlement for indigenous landholders, but otherwise leaving as much of the 
internal administration of the right as practicable with the landholders themselves.218 
Boelens et al describe the approach as ‘establishing the necessary conditions under the 
law (access to water and autonomy for management), in order to stay out of the way of 
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the law’.219 Chilean law providing for indigenous water rights has attempted to do that, 
by providing indigenous landholders with a share of derechos de aprovechamiento in 
the market, but resisting the urge to further particularise the rights for indigenous right 
holders.220 This means that representatives of indigenous landholders would need to be 
involved in state water planning, something that is called for in the National Water 
Initiative,221 and has already been implemented to a degree in some states and 
territories.222  
 
The design of a statutory allocation model is not a simple process of legislating an 
entitlement and must involve a ‘longer process of interaction, mutual adaptation and 
incitement to reflection and reform’.223 However, to address the historical and ongoing 
inequity, by which indigenous people have been excluded from water law frameworks, 
any legislation providing for commercial indigenous water rights should satisfy certain 
criteria. The indigenous water rights should have the same broad characteristics as the 
‘water access entitlements’ held by other right holders224 as: ‘a perpetual or open-ended 
share of the consumptive pool of a specified water resource, as determined by the 
relevant water plan’.225 The ‘indigenous water access entitlement’ would take from the 
consumptive pool and be exercisable for private benefit consumptive purposes 
including irrigation, industry, urban and stock and domestic use.226 The quantum of 
water allocated to an indigenous water access entitlement in any particular area is 
something that requires further consideration, together with indigenous landholders and 
state water planners. O’Donnell has suggested that the quantum be determined with 
reference to a number of factors, including indigenous landholding and indigenous 
disadvantage.227 Unlike the New South Wales ‘commercial access licences’, the 
indigenous water access entitlement would need to be large enough to support 
commercial activities on indigenous lands. 
 
If it were to have the same characteristics as the water access entitlements held by other 
right holders, an indigenous water access entitlement must be ‘exclusive’, ‘able to be 
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traded, given, bequeathed or leased’, ‘able to be subdivided or amalgamated’, ‘be 
mortgageable (and in this respect have similar status as freehold land when used as 
collateral for accessing finance), ‘be enforceable and enforced’, and ‘be recorded in 
publicly-accessible reliable water registers that foster public confidence and state 
unambiguously who owns the entitlement, and the nature of any encumbrances on it’.228 
An indigenous water access entitlement, therefore, would have many of the 
characteristics of indigenous water rights in Chile, which, in Chile’s civil law context, 
have the status of ownership (propiedad). Yet, whether indigenous rights to land and 
resources should be transferable is controversial, and legal mechanisms that recognise 
indigenous rights to land and resources often place limits on the alienability of such 
rights.229 Native title rights to water, for example, are inalienable and cannot be 
transferred, leased or mortgaged.230 Restrictions on alienation are sometimes justified 
on the basis that permanent alienation of property rights is not possible in traditional 
indigenous culture.231 They are also considered necessary to maintain indigenous 
control of rights to land and resources for the economic and cultural benefit of future 
generations.232 However, restrictions on alienation are often criticised for their 
dampening effect on indigenous development, particularly by preventing the raising of 
finance.233  The recent ‘White Paper on Developing Northern Australia’, for example, 
provides that ‘Indigenous Australians should be able to use their exclusive native title 
to attract capital necessary for economic development’.234 
 
In Chile, derechos de aprovechamiento acquired with finance from the Indigenous 
Land and Water Fund are ‘inalienable’ for 25 years without administrative consent 
(including by transfer of ownership, embargo, tax, prescription or lease), although the 
restriction may be lifted if the finance is repaid. The stated purpose of the restriction 
was to maintain resources in indigenous ownership for future economic development, 
while also supporting government return on investment. The 25-year restriction on 
alienation of indigenous water rights acquired with finance from Chile’s Indigenous 
Land and Water Fund provoked prolonged debate in the Parliament with some 
representatives arguing that such a ‘market limitation’ would only reduce the resource’s 
value.235 As a compromise, the Chilean Parliament agreed to allow transfers of 
indigenous land and water rights ‘within the same indigenous ethnicity’.236  Senator 
Navarrete described the mechanism, as it applied to land, as creating an ‘indigenous 
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land market’, whereby properties could be commercialised, alienated or transferred 
within indigenous communities.237  
 
Whether the alienation of indigenous water rights should be restricted in Australia is 
also controversial, and is a matter for further (indigenous-led) research and 
consultation, although policy designers are experimenting with novel approaches and 
compromises. For example, restrictions on alienability have been relaxed to an extent 
under the Water Management Act 2000 (NSW), with Aboriginal access licences being 
transferable amongst Aboriginal people.238 The North Australian Indigenous Land and 
Sea Management Alliance has proposed that indigenous water rights be exclusive and 
able to be temporarily traded, subdivided or amalgamated, mortgageable, enforceable 
and registered.239 Either way, alienability may not be a necessary precondition for the 
use of water for commercial purposes, or a prerequisite for future indigenous economic 
development more generally. Indigenous landholders may still exercise water use rights 
for commercial purposes as contemplated here (rather than trade in the rights 
themselves) if the rights are inalienable. The potential for transfer of an indigenous 
water access entitlement within or between indigenous groups, or leasing of an 
indigenous water access entitlement to other water users, suggests future potential 
revenue streams for indigenous landholders. 
 
3 An Indigenous Water Holder 
 
An important lesson from the study of Chilean laws providing for indigenous water 
rights in this article is that, in the case of fully allocated water resources, indigenous 
water rights cannot be provided for without some form of redistribution. Any law 
providing indigenous landholders with a water access entitlement must confront the fact 
that in many parts of Australia, particularly the Murray Darling Basin, water resources 
are already fully allocated. The Indigenous Land and Water Fund sought to balance 
indigenous and non-indigenous historical rights in water as a ‘fair solution’;240 
facilitating redistribution in a way that did not impact adversely on other right holders, 
because water use rights would be voluntarily acquired in water markets.  
 
Funding mechanisms have been used in Australia in the past to redistribute rights in the 
land market. For example, the Aboriginal Land Fund was established to work alongside 
indigenous land rights legislation to ‘assist Aboriginal Communities to acquire Land 
outside Aboriginal Reserves’241 and operated from 1975–1980.242 In 1995, as part of 
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reforms to the Native Title Act the Commonwealth set up the Indigenous Land 
Corporation, the former Prime Minister noting: 
 
While these communities remain dispossessed of land, their economic marginalisation 
and their sense of injury continues. As a first step, we are establishing a land fund. It will 
enable indigenous people to acquire land and to manage and maintain it in a sustainable 
way in order to provide economic, social and cultural benefits for future generations. 
Addressing dispossession is essential but will not be enough to overcome the legacy of 
the past and achieve reconciliation.243 
 
The Indigenous Land Corporation continues to ‘assist Indigenous peoples in Australia 
to acquire land and to manage Indigenous-held land … to provide cultural, social, 
economic or environmental benefits for themselves and for future generations’.244 
However, the Australian land funds did not, and do not, apply to water.  
 
An Aboriginal Water Trust operated in New South Wales between 2000 and 2009 to 
provide specific purpose grant funding for water infrastructure and offering 
‘opportunities to establish water based commercially viable enterprises for Aboriginal 
communities’.245 It did not, however, finance the acquisition of water use rights for 
Aboriginal groups in the market. Indigenous groups have started to lobby Australian 
governments for the establishment of an indigenous water fund to finance the purchase 
of water use rights.246 For example, the First Peoples’ Water Engagement Council, an 
indigenous representative advisory group established by the former National Water 
Commission, released an options paper recommending the establishment of an 
‘Indigenous Economic Water Fund’ in April 2012,247 the key purpose of which was: 
 
economic development as distinct from indigenous cultural and environmental water that 
should be set out in [the] planning process. The [Indigenous Economic Water Fund] is 
not an alternative to addressing access to cultural and customary water but an additional 
policy to improve the economic lives of indigenous people.248 
 
The Council proposed that the Fund would be used to acquire water use rights for 
‘indigenous people’ to support economic development, via a range of acquisition 
mechanisms including ‘government buyback’, ‘philanthropic buyback’, ‘self-funded 
buyback’ and ‘gift’.249  
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The study of Chile’s Indigenous Land and Water Fund demonstrates the importance of 
setting aside a ‘water reserve’ in areas where water resources are not already allocated 
to third parties. The failure of the Chilean government to set aside a portion of water 
use rights for indigenous use in the future, prior to resources reaching full allocation, 
has undermined the effectiveness of the Fund, because water rights acquisitions at 
market prices are costly and the Fund receives limited governmental support. Many 
water resources in Australia are yet to be fully allocated to water use rights, particularly 
in the well-watered north. However, water markets encourage competition for water 
use rights, placing further strain on the availability of water use rights for attending to 
indigenous water demands in the future. For this reason some indigenous groups have 
started to agitate for commercial water rights outside of the native title process, as a 
‘pragmatic response’ to the increased competition for water caused by unbundling and 
water markets.250 Some water reserves have already been set aside in Queensland and 
the Northern Territory, to help indigenous communities achieve economic and social 
aspirations. The former National Water Commission stressed the need for both a water 
fund and water reserve in 2012, recommending: 
 
that in water systems that are fully allocated the creation of a fund to acquire appropriate 
water rights should be considered. In systems not fully allocated alternative approaches 
such as Strategic Indigenous Reserves could be set aside in water planning processes.251 
 
A statutory allocation model, comprising both a water fund and water reserve, has 
already been successfully implemented in Australia with respect to environmental 
water. The Commonwealth Environmental Water Holder was established by the Water 
Act 2007 (Cth) to manage environmental water holdings in the Murray Darling Basin. 
As well as managing instream environmental water interests, the Commonwealth 
Environmental Water Holder has the capacity both to hold water use rights and 
purchase (and sell) water use rights in the market, in the interests of the environment.252 
The Commonwealth Environmental Water Holder is now the single largest holder of 
environmental water rights in Australia.253  Its portfolio of water use rights was acquired 
through a combination of government purchases and savings of water via investment in 
water supply infrastructure that reduced water losses and incentivised reduced water 
use.254 Significantly, the portfolio of water use rights acquired by the Commonwealth 
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An indigenous water holder could even be provided for within the existing institutional 
framework for the Indigenous Land Corporation (which was specifically intended for 
situations where historical claims could not be established), expanded to reallocate 
water as well as land rights.255 However, further research is needed, with indigenous 
people, to consider the viability of an indigenous water holder in Australia and the detail 
for its implementation, which is beyond the scope of this article. Important questions 
remain about the quantum of water that should be allocated to an indigenous water 
access entitlement, and the extent to which such an entitlement can be transferred 
independent of land or permanently alienated. However, an indigenous water holder 
could play an instrumental role in responding to the unjust distribution of commercial 




The literature on indigenous water rights often portrays the unbundling of water use 
rights from landholding, and the presence of water markets, as a threat to continued 
water access by indigenous groups leading to the accumulation of water use rights by 
third parties.256 It is undeniable that indigenous exclusion from water law frameworks 
intensified as a result of unbundling in Australia. However, indigenous Australians have 
been excluded from laws providing for water use rights as an incident of landholding 
since the acquisition of sovereignty. It was that historical exclusion that enabled other 
right holders to accumulate water use rights. Somewhat ironically, the unbundling of 
water use rights from land title and the emergence of water markets has also provided 
the basic conditions necessary for implementing a statutory allocation model. 
 
When the Council of Australian Governments agreed to unbundle water use rights from 
landholding and introduce water trading in the early 1990s, the opportunity to allocate 
a share of water use rights to indigenous-specific landholders was not taken.257 The 
absence of debate about indigenous water rights in the early 1990s might be explained 
by preoccupation with the fledgling native title process, which at first showed great 
promise for the recognition of land and water rights.258 However, as discussed here, 
native title has failed to recognise rights to water for commercial purposes. 
 
The Chilean experience is one example of a statutory allocation model being used to 
redistribute water use rights to indigenous landholders. Ritter argues in the Australian 
context that statutory indigenous land rights, when compared to native title, amount to 
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a ‘favour’ rather than a ‘right’.259 This characterisation may exaggerate the strength of 
the native title model, although it is a reminder that statutory mechanisms for 
indigenous rights depend on the political will of governments: a political vulnerability 
clear in the previous Northern Territory Government’s declaration that it will not 
include strategic indigenous reserves in future water plans,260 lack of development on 
the Indigenous Economic Water Fund since the options paper released in 2012, and 
inactivity of the First Peoples’ Water Engagement Council. Yet, for the reasons I have 
argued here, renewed attention must now be given to indigenous demands for 
commercial water rights. As a reassuring indication of future policy tendencies, 
Victoria’s new Water for Victoria plan includes a section on Aboriginal access to water 
for economic development, and recommends a combination of water savings, 
acquisitions and buy backs to enable water allocations to indigenous people without 
impacting the water rights of other users.261  
 
A statutory allocation model has already been implemented in Australia on more than 
one occasion. Indigenous land rights legislation, for example, arose out of the inability 
of the common law to recognise native title rights to land in Australia. In establishing 
the Environmental Water Holder, the Commonwealth Government committed 
considerable investment in buying-back water for the environment.262 Ultimately, 
government investment in these statutory allocation models, as with the statutory 
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